



Most law and economics scholars agree that private information
represents a significant practical impediment to efficiency.' This
consensus is richly deserved-in many real-world market settings,
economic actors possess proprietary knowledge about the underlying
characteristics of the transactions at issue. Sellers of real estate, for
instance, often know about the existence of creaky floors, leaky roofs,
and insect infestations.2 Issuers of securities are privy to confidential
data on financial fundamentals. 3 Used car dealers possess hidden
knowledge about latent mechanical defects and repair histories.
Corporate fiduciaries have superior information about the merits of a
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I See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 269-71 (1995)
(discussing problems of information asymmetries for both markets and courts); ERIC
RAsNIUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 227
(1989) (noting that in the presence of information asymmetries, garden variety
assumptions about efficient competitive markets are likely to fail); Alan Schwartz, Legal
Cntract Theories and Incomplete Contracts, in CONTRACI ECONOMIcs 76, 81 (Lars Werin
& Hans Wijkander eds., 1992) (referring to contracts with terms conditioned on
unverifiable private information as "legally incomplete").
" See, eg., Lenawee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 205-06
(Mich. 1982) (discussing the sale of a property that was unsuitable for habitation, in
part because of an inadequate and uncorrectable sewage system).
.See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226-28, 232-41 (1988) (examining
the standard of information materiality applicable to preliminary merger discussions
in a case in which one party publicly denied that such discussions were taking place).
See, e.g., Schneider v. Miller, 597 N.E.2d 175, 176 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(discussing the sale of a car later found to have extensive underbody rust).
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proposed transaction or business combination.
In each of these examples (and countless others), informed
parties have an incentive to capitalize on their advantage by devising
strategies to exploit their less knowledgeable counterparts.
Anticipating this possibility, of course, uninformed individuals may
respond with cautious strategies of their own calculated to minimize
their exposure. Though individually rational, such strategic
maneuvering is nevertheless socially undesirable, for it tends to
distort-often significantly-the dynamics of the negotiation process,
discouraging value-enhancing bargains from being struck (and
perhaps even encouraging value-destroying ones). Within such
contexts lies a possible invitation for courts to regulate the incidence
and magnitude of inefficiencies due to informational asymmetry.
And have courts ever obliged. Examples abound in which legal
doctrines have been devised in an attempt-active or passive-to
encourage accurate information disclosure, particularly within
corporate settings, with the ostensible goal of ameliorating the
dangers posed by adverse selection. The law of express and implied
warranties, for example, has general and far-reaching implications for
both ordinary market transactions 6 and for "due-diligence" disputes
within the mergers and acquisitions context.7  Corporate law
discourages officers and directors from causing their firms to enter
into interested transactions without first disclosing the conflict to
disinterested directors or shareholders and seeking approval. And
5 See, e.g., Speed v. Transanerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 816-20 (D. Del. 1951)
(discussing a controlling shareholder who had superior information about the value of
company inventory and purchased additional stock of the company without disclosing
this knowledge).
6 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -316 (1995) (covering express and implied warranties
and exclusion or modification of warranties). Indeed, warranty law is the doctrinal
basis for virtually all modem products liability cases.
7 See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g Co., 554 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (N.Y. 1990)
(discussing a breach of express warranty claim by a buyer who had questioned the
accuracy of financial information but did not believe in the truth of the information
received). Warranty law is similarly important in private placements of securities and
other privately negotiated stock transactions, particularly after the limiting effect of
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 567-73 (1995) (constraining the ability of private
purchasers to take advantage of § 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act by adopting a
narrow definition of "prospectus").
8 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991) (validating "interested director"
transactions where the director's interest is disclosed and the transaction is approved
by disinterested directors or shareholders). While section 144 does not absolutely
prohibit such transactions without full disclosure, when there is no disclosure, a
corporate fiduciary must carry the burden of proving the transaction to be "fair"--a
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perhaps most notoriously, both federal and state securities laws
impose a daunting and complex labyrinth of disclosure regulations on
individual issuers, insiders, and traders-regulations that are
frequently enforceable through private rights of action." In all of
these contexts (and in many others), those who fail to make the
requisite disclosures or who disclose inaccurate information bear a
significant risk of downstream legal liability.
Perhaps because of the considerable stakes involved, judicial
inquiries into the accuracy of corporate information disclosure are
now relatively commonplace. And, perhaps concomitantly, such
inquiries have drawn sharp criticism from those who would advocate a
more noninterventionist position. Many critics marshal at least two
related arguments in support of their normative stance.
First, they contend that while third-party adjudicators are
reasonably skilled arbiters of truth in garden-variety disputes, judges
and juries are considerably more susceptible to judgment errors in
complex disclosure disputes, where the allegedly misleading
information is "soft," speculative, or predictive in nature. Indeed,
impartial adjudicators may be particularly likely to err in such contexts,
having first to reconstruct and interpret the often technical language
that attends such disclosures, and then to assess the ultimate accuracy
of such statements long after the fact. These tasks are no simple feats
for judges and juries, who generally possess neither technical
familiarity with the underlying issues, nor any direct knowledge of the
actual context in which the initial disclosures were made.'0
Consequently, the argument goes, the inevitable inaccuracies that
result may significantly undercut the deterrent incentives provided by
legal sanctions, perhaps even rendering such sanctions counter-
productive."'
relatively daunting requirement. Id.
See generally RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1998) (examining various aspects of disclosure throughout the casebook).
I. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE L w 100 (1991) ("Judges are neither chosen for business acumen nor
fired or subject to reductions in salary if they err in assessing business situations."); see
alsoJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. Rv. 571, 572-76 (1998) (describing problems of hindsight bias that frequently
plagu e retrospective legal assessments on technical matters).
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 10, at 305 (arguing that securities
fraud regimes work best when "applied to statements of issuer-specific historical fact"
rather than soft, foirard-looking information); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF L-kw 265-66 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that extreme judicial inaccuracy
defeats the deterrent effect of legal rules); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
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Second, critics maintain that legal liability is far from the sole
instrument for encouraging honesty in informationally sensitive
markets. On the contrary, they assert that even without courts (or
perhaps especially without them), extralegal "norms" of disclosure can
evolve over time as a less formal, but nonetheless effective, instrument
of deterrence. Indeed, many actors within corporate contexts are
repeat players who fear being punished in future market transactions
should they develop a reputation for nondisclosure or
misrepresentation. Moreover, individuals and organizations that
develop trustworthy reputations are likely to be the ones that survive
in the longer term, and may, in the process, inculcate among their
employees and managers a set of shared preferences for open and
honest disclosure. In fact, because reputational sanctions are invoked
by the parties themselves, such desires are far less susceptible to the
errors and inaccuracies that plague third-party adjudication.
Consequently, critics conclude, extralegal norms possess a greater
capacity for effecting honest and efficient dissemination than does an
inept, inaccurate, and indulgent system of regulation by judicial
hindsight.
12
The purpose of this Article is to interrogate the relationship
between judicial error and extralegal norms more formally, focusing
particularly on typical corporate disclosure contexts. In so doing, I
shall argue that this relationship is far less clear-cut than much of the
literature suggests. Using a formal, game-theoretic model of
information disclosure, I demonstrate that in the presence of'judicial
error, a society that benefits from extralegal norms of honest
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735,
1739 (2001) (arguing that "attempts to employ external incentives can often reduce
levels of trust and trustworthiness within the firm by eroding corporate participants'
internal motivations" (emphasis omitted)).
12 See EAsTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 10, at 98-100 (arguing that market
forces are better able to discipline dishonest corporate actors than error-prone courts);
see also BAIRD ET AL., supra note 1, at 57 (arguing that reputations may be a substitute
for extralegal norms); POSNER, supra note 11, at 110-11 (noting that market and
community discipline may sometimes substitute for legal regulation, though also
providing counterarguments to this claim); Marilyn F.Johnson et al., Shareholder Wealth
Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 5 REV. ACCT. STUD. 217, 217-33
(2000).
A similar sort of claim appears in other applications of norms theory. See, e.g.,
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceabilit of Norms and the Emploment
Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1933 (1996) (arguing that "when the facts needed
to resolve disputes are difficult to verify, the parties themselves are in a better position
than a third party to evaluate them," and that in such instances "norms built around
self-enforcing rules are superior to third party enforcement").
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disclosure might ironically favor more expansive legal regulation than
would a similarly situated society in which norms are weak or
nonexistent. Thus, in contrast to the common argument that norms
can (or should) substitute for error-prone law, I argue that the two
phenomena may frequently complement each other.
The intuition behind my thesis is a bit subtle, and its detailed
explication is therefore relegated to the formal analysis below.
13
Nevertheless, the core intuitions emanate directly from a sequence of
relatively simple observations. First, and most fundamentally, law is an
inherently multidimensional policy instrument. Nearly every legal
rule serves at least two distinct functions (if not more): a liability
function (which determines when one is deemed to have acted
wrongly) and a sanctioning function (which determines the monetary
and/or nonmonetary consequences that attend wrongful conduct).
Significantly, there is no a priori reason to believe that law and norms
must interact uniformly across these constituent functions.
Second, norms of honesty often have the effect of augmenting the
sanctioning function of law, contributing additional social penalties
that further deter wrongful behavior." This extralegal contribution to
sanctions enables courts to reduce the magnitude of legal sanctions
without compromising their target level of deterrence.
Third, as noted above, unlike their legal counterparts, norm-based
sanctions are often exercised by market participants directly, without
the intervention of a third party. Thus, such sanctions are frequently
less susceptible to the verification errors that typically hamper third-
party adjudication. In turn, this implies that as error-prone courts
reduce legal sanctions to accommodate social sanctions, the aggregate
costs of sanctioning errors borne by market participants will also
decline.
Therein lies the rub: the reduction in sanctioning-error costs
identified above may be sufficiently large to permit courts to expand
law's reach in other dimensions, such as its liability function. In other
words, because extralegal norms facilitate milder legal sanctions,
13 See infra Part II (analyzing information disclosure problems through a
framework drawn from game theory).
14 To be sure, extralegal norms do not operate solely on the sanctioning level,
since the very definition of what constitutes "norm violation" must also be defined and
specified. In the analysis that follows, however, I shall hold this latter specification role
constant, varying only the former sanctioning role that norms play. See infra Part II.H.
Nothing turns on this portrayal of norms, however, and my qualitative thesis would
persist under alternative accounts of norms that varied the specification role only or
both simultaneously. I revisit some of these robustness questions infra, in Part III.
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efficiency-minded courts may become more interventionist in
situations that they would otherwise eschew for fear of imposing
excessive risk. Hence, by enabling milder legal penalties, truth-telling
norms may ironically encourage courts to become more aggressive in
specifying the universe of circumstances that trigger liability in the
first place-effectively causing the long arm of the law to grow even
longer (albeit somewhat less muscular). A society with both error-
prone courts and extralegal norms of honesty, then, may very well end
up implementing liability triggers that appear more aggressive than
those of a society possessing equally error-prone courts, but less-
developed norms of disclosure.
While examining the potential complementarity of law and norms
is an interesting conceptual exercise, it is not merely an academic
curiosity. On the contrary, it carries important lessons for lawyers,
judges, and legal scholars who are engaged both in the positive
inquiry about the practical domain of norms and in the prescriptive
enterprise of designing law in the presence of norms. Regarding the
former endeavor, much of the law and economics literature tends to
portray individual behavior as relatively binary in nature-falling
under the headings of "law compliance" or "norm following," but
rarely both simultaneously. 5 By demonstrating the capacity for law to
complement norms, my argument suggests that scholars seeking to
identify the practical domain of norms should be cautious about
15 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL supra note 10, at 100 (noting that because
courts are prone to errors in evaluating managerial conduct, "[ift is better to insulate
all honest [managerial] decisions from review than to expose managers and directors
to review by judges and juries who do not face market pressures"); id. at 95-96 ("As the
present value of forgone compensation [because of reputational loss] in future periods
increases relative to the current gains from poor performance, liability rules become
less important."); RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 201
(1995) ("[Where the reputational bond is strong, the legal bonds may be weak,
because the incentives for good conduct can be secured without having to incur the
extensive administrative costs of any system of liability."); ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOcIAL NOR.Ms 64 (2000) (arguing that contract law's refusal to enforce donative
promises is a result of the fact that contracting parties themselves can "deter
opportunism through nonlegal mechanisms more effectively than the courts could
through legal mechanisms," and asserting that "[d]octrines that prevent judicial
enforcement are justified on the grounds that judicial enforcement would interfere
with trust relationships"); Rock & Wachter, supra note 12, at 1933 (arguing that "when
the facts needed to resolve disputes are difficult to verify, the parties themselves are in
a better position than a third party to evaluate them," and that "[iun such cases, norms
built around self-enforcing rules are superior to third party enforcement"); id. at 1938
("[W]hen a system of norms is self-sustaining and does not impose costs on third
parties... courts should do nothing, adopting a rule which.., forces the parties to
rely on the self-enforcing properties of their arrangement.").
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overlooking or dismissing arenas of conduct that are already governed
by existing liability rules.1 'e Indeed, when norms and law are
complements of one another, the two phenomena are likely to be
highly correlated as an empirical matter. Thus, existing legal rules
may be where we should begin our search for norms, not end it.
Likewise, the potential complementarity between law and norms
implies that reform-minded scholars should be cautious about
advocating the retrenchment or elimination of legal regulation in
situations where apparently strong, norm-like behavior exists." To the
contrary, champions of nonintervention must do more than argue
that beneficial disclosure norms are plausible, or even likely. They
must also demonstrate that the form of legal regulation they wish to
eliminate fundamentally inhibits (rather than catalyzes) the
concurrent development of norms.
Before proceeding, it is perhaps prudent to pause and clarify a few
important caveats to my argument. First, as should be clear from the
foregoing discussion, my principal arguments are most relevant to
contexts involving deceptive statements by informationally advantaged
parties. Legal doctrines that fall within this domain include topics like
misrepresentation, deceit, and securities fraud. My analysis is
somewhat less relevant to whether the act of disclosure itself should be
mandatory or left to market participants.' 8 While this is an important
line of inquiry, and has itself spawned significant attention among law
and economics scholars, it will enter my analysis only tangentially.
Instead, my principal focus is on whether courts should construe the
precontractual statements made by privately informed parties as
creating the prospect of legal liability.
Second, the related question of whether contractual freedom can
p. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Law, 149 U.
PA. L. REX. 1869, 1872-73 (2001) (arguing that norms are relatively unimportant in
corporate law, but eliminating from the analysis all areas of beha-ior that are already
governed by existing legal liability regimes).
17 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 1 (explaining that the duty
of loyalty may still require legal regulation when "penalties through markets are
inadequate"); POSNER, supra note 11 at 110-11 (stating that legal remedies against
fraud may remain necessary even when market remedies against misrepresentations
seem adequate); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Nonns, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2001)
(arguing that corporate law protects and perfects the choice of firms "to replace legal
governance of relations with nonlegally enforceable governance mechanisms [that is,
norm,]").
. Indeed, as shall become apparent below, the model that I analyze effectively
presumes that all sellers make a disclosure before the market opens.
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"solve" all problems of information disclosure is also relatively
tangential to my analysis. While this is undeniably an important
question for legal theory (and, by all indications, will continue to be
so), my inquiry is somewhat more fundamental still. Indeed, the very
principle of freedom of contract presupposes that courts can readily
ascertain what parties are contracting for to begin with. It is of little
more than rhetorical assistance in contexts such as those analyzed
here, where courts must assign liability implications to the often
opaque and technical disclosures made by contracting parties. When
judicial interpretation is itself prone to error, the idealized and
rarified notion of contractual freedom loses much of its meaning and
analytical power.19
Third, I should endeavor to clarify (at least minimally) my
conception of a "norm" in the analysis that follows. After all, there is
great disagreement among scholars as to what exactly constitutes the
stuff of norms. ° Some subscribe to an account that is closely tied to
economic self-interest, under which an individual rationally chooses to
comply with an established pattern of behavior for fear of incurring
sanctions from others or damage to her reputation. 2' An alternative
account argues that norm-like behavior emerges as the result of
increasing returns, or "network externalities" associated with a specific
set of practices that become difficult to alter once widespread.22 Still
other scholars offer an account of norms that is more thoroughly
rooted in deep preferences, arguing that individuals actually develop
(or evolve towards) a taste for behaving in a manner consistent with
the existing standard. Each of these alternative accounts shares a
19 Having said that, as the formal analysis below demonstrates, there may well be
certain circumstances in which it would actually be inefficient for courts to allocate
maximal contractual freedom to parties, because allowing such autonomy might
provide market participants with an incentive to send inefficiently costly signals to
others. See infra Part II (discussing what happens when adjudication becomes severely
inaccurate); see also Phillipe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Pi'ate
Contracts Can Enhance Effiviency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381, 381-83 (1990) (making a
similar "costly-signaling" argument).
20 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norns,
86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000) (outlining various accounts of norms and some of the
confusion caused by them).
21 E.g., POSNER, supra note 15, at 34 (defining social norms as "the behavioral
regularities that occur in equilibrium when people use signals to show that they belong
to the good type").
22 E.g., Kahan, supra note 16, at 1882-95 (discussing norms and corporate powers).
23 E.g., Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficien- ' in
Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1724 (arguing that internalized guilt can force people
not to violate a norm).
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"behavioral" perspective on norms-conceiving them to be commonly
shared practices that people tend to pursue even though legal rules
alone do not compel them to do so. This perspective stands in stark
contrast with many philosophers' views of a "norm," which hinge
more squarely on a moral imperative that is (or at least can be)
independent of preferences. Without exception, the arguments I
make below all subscribe to the former, behavioral views of norms
24rather than the latter, moral view. Moreover, in situations in which I
rish to concentrate on a specific behavioral account of norms, I will
do so explicitly.
Finally, I should reiterate that my thesis is one that emphasizes a
possibility, and not an inevitability. In other words, the analysis below
demonstrates that law and norms can complement one another, but
not that the), must always do so. There are undoubtedly numerous
situations where norms and law are substitutes, and in those contexts
it may be perfectly defensible for policynakers to relax legal
regulation in order to encourage the evolution of healthy norms.5 I
have no quarrel with such arguments. Rather, my enterprise in this
Article is to emphasize the complexity of the relationship between law
and norms, and by so doing admonish policynakers not to be cavalier
about the instrumental relationship between law and norms when
advancing their positions.
My analysis proceeds in three parts: Part I of this Article provides
a brief summary of two nonexhaustive situations in which legal
disclosure regulations and associated safe harbors play important
practical roles for the corporate practitioner-warranty law and
securities law. I argue that within both of these areas (and potentially
many others), the rhetorical debate over safe harbors tends to invoke
the tin arguments outlined above-the fear ofjudicial error and the
promising deterrent role of extralegal norms.
Building on these observations, Part II provides the core
substantive analysis, developing a simple framework drawn from game
theory to analyze information disclosure problems. Using a
representative numerical example, I demonstrate how legal rules-if
sufficiently accurate-may be able to respond efficiently to problems
of private information. Nevertheless, when adjudication becomes
_, While the moral account of norms is important (and may well have links with at
least some sociological xiews), this Article shall have little to say about them.
-" Indeed, even within the formal example described below, law and norms
substitute for one another on the sanctioning dimension, while complementing one
another on the liability dimension. See infra Part II.
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severely inaccurate, the beneficial effects of law can dissipate
completely, thereby providing a tentative justification for constraining
the reach of disclosure laws (by, for example, liberalizing safe harbor
rules).
Part II then switches gears to ask whether the same analysis would
persist in a society with an equally error-prone legal system, but in
which constituent actors were motivated partially by extralegal norms
of honesty. Contrary to received wisdom, the added presence of such
norms may ironically justify a relatively unforgiving safe harbor rule
even when liberal safe harbors would be optimal in the absence of
norms.
Part III examines variations and extensions to the model, asking
(among other things) whether my arguments are sensitive to a few
important variations, such as might change if one accounted for fully
internalized norms, the "expressive" role of law in setting norms, or a
more complete account of norms as an endogenous artifact of repeat
play. I conclude that such variations are likely to do little to alter my
principal qualitative thesis about norm-law complementarity, and may
even strengthen it in certain respects.
I. DISCLOSURE, LAW, AND SAFE HARBORS
This Part presents a brief analysis of two important (but
nonexhaustive) areas within corporate practice where the law plays an
important role in regulating market disclosures: contractual
warranties and anti-fraud provisions of federal securities law.
Interestingly, both of these doctrinal applications tend to provide (in
some form or another) certain "safe harbors" for sellers who wish to
avoid the risk of prospective liability to the recipient of the disclosure.
As we shall see, these safe harbors essentially what amounts to a
linguistic threshold of protected disclosure beyond which the
disclosing party risks subsequent legal liability. The usual rhetorical
justification of such safe harbors is that they act-either explicitly or
implicitly-as buffers against the specter of judicial error, allowing
norms of behavior to play a larger role.
A. Warranty Law
Warranty law has come to play a far-reaching and important role
in corporate practice. To be sure, merchants for a long time have
faced liability for breach of implied or express warranties concerning
consumer goods. Yet warranty law easily transcends the traditional
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bounds. A well-known example of this expansion is products liability
law, the result of a direct mutation of implied warranties during the
early twentieth century." But warranty law also plays an important
role in the mergers and acquisitions context. For example, it is now
commonplace for acquisition targets to make explicit warranties to
buyers regarding the value of a company's goodwill, its intellectual
property, its other tangible assets, the existence of adverse tax or wage
consequences of a change in control, and the like." Such warranties
are, in fact, particularly common in situations where an extensive due
diligence period is impossible, either because of the secrecy of the
acquisition, time constraints, or the lack of previous disclosures by the
target (if, for example, it is privately held)." Indeed, such devices
have become so prevalent within the M&A context in the last five
years that they have spawned an entire subindustry of liability
insurance policies for sellers (and even buyers) who later are found to
have breached express warranties in a control transaction or sale of
assets."' Moreover, for disappointed buyers who purchase securities
through privately negotiated transactions, state-based warranty law
similarly may be their most availing alternative."
Hence, this sub-Part explores the law of both implied and express
warranties in greater detail, emphasizing the dictates of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). Although the U.C.C. is not compelling
authority for all warranty cases, it is for many (including the inter-firm
sales of assets), and courts frequently tend to cite the U.C.C. as• • 31
persuasive authority even when it is not strictly applicable.
See LANVRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 460, 684-85 (2d ed.
1985) (noting that products liability law "hardly existed" before 1900, but exploded
during the twentieth century).
See, e.g., Judith L. Church, Intellectual Property Aspects of Corporate Acquisitions, in
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 323,
343-45 (American Law Institute, Sept. 2000) (outlining potentially desirable
representations and warranties regarding the transfer of intellectual property).
1. See id. at 346 (adising practitioners to use representations and warranties to
supplement due diligence).
Z" Joseph P. Monteleone, Financial Insurance Solutions to Exposures Arising from
Moi ger, Acquisition and Related Transactions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 2000, at 479 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series, PLI Order No. B0-00NV, 2000),
WL 1199 PLI/Corp 479.
3' See, e.g., Peter V. Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 45 EMoRY L.J. 95, 128 (1996) (arguing that state Arranty
law is more availing than § 10(b) litigation for private purchasers after Gustafson v.
Allovd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995)).
Moreover, the U.C.C.'s provisions on limiting or disclaiming wrarranties is
incorporated wholesale in the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
196520011
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1. Implied Warranties
In agreements governed by the U.C.C., warranties are virtually
ubiquitous. In fact, seller warranties are thought to be so important
for such contracts that they constitute some of the most important
default rules of commercial law. Courts routinely imply warranty
obligations into U.C.C.-governed contracts in order to fill the
inevitable gaps left unaddressed by express terms. Although there are
a number of important implied warranties," perhaps the most
sweeping and important of them is the implied warranty of
merchantability ("IWM")Y.3 A distant cousin and doctrinal ancestor of
modern product liability law, the IWM essentially constitutes a
guarantee by the seller that the purchased goods will not possess
unexpected, latent flaws that would impair their functionality or prove
unreasonably dangerous under normal conditions. 4
Much of the application of the IWM turns on the U.C.C.'s
definition of merchantability-a definition that draws on a quasi-
empirical standard representing an average or ordinary measure of
quality within the relevant product market.3 As Section 2-314 states:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair and average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
("UCITA").
32 A more complete analysis might consider, among other things, the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the implied warranty of title, and the
implied warranty of "informational content" under UCITA. I do not touch these here.
3 The IWM is also incorporated wholesale into both Article 2A of the U.C.C. and
UCITA.
34 JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SECURED
TRANSACTIONS § 9-7, at 349-50 (4th ed. 1995).
3 For an example of a case where a court struggled with the merchantability of
cigarettes because of evidence that they cause cancer, see Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam). In that case, the Fifth Circuit overruled its
prior judgment, see Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968) (en banc),
and adopted the reasoning of the dissent, which had found that the cigarettes at issue
were merchantable because "they [were] exactly like all others" that could be
purchased, id. at 110 (Simpson,J., dissenting).
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(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
36
The first three of the above aspects of merchantability underscore
the conceptual measure of quality that the IMM envisions. Although
neither the U.C.C. nor the case law more generally mandates a
particular statistical measure of central tendency (such as median,
mean, or mode), the implicit instruction to a court is clear: the court
must formulate a view about the relevant population of comparison
within a domain of identical (or at least close substitute) goods, a task
not unlike what an antitrust court attempts to accomplish when
defining a relevant market for determining market power.-7 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, then, characterizing the relevant domain by which to
measure "ordinary purposes" is no mean judicial feat, and is a source
of consistent contest within litigated cases. Courts have been willing
to entertain numerous theories about the relevant comparison class,
including evidence about course of dealing,"s the norms of trade
practice,-") compliance (or noncompliance) with governmental
regulatory standards,4' and products that carry a comparable sales
price. "
Factors (d) through (f) listed in section 2-314 evince a slightly
different set of considerations-those pertaining to the role of express
contracting. Indeed, the IWM is a true default rule (at least in
theory), and allows the parties to augment, relax, or completely
supersede its doctrinal contours by express contractual provisions.
(Such modifications, which are quite common in practice, receive
3, U.C.c. § 2-314(2) (1995).
,7 Of course, there is no particular reason to think that the conventional antitrust
definition of a relevant market, which hinges on the degree to which consumers are
illing to substitute out of the posited market in the face of a price increase, must also
be the operative definition for courts in assessing product quality, but the fact-
specificity of the test clearly requires courts to specify some "equivalence class" of
products against which to measure deviation. SeeJOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRGCrS § 100 (3d ed. 1990).
Id.
Kassab v. Cent. Soya, 246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968).
See, e.g., George Byers Sons, Inc. v. E. Europe Imp. Exp., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 574,
580 (D. Md. 1980) (finding breach of implied and express warranty for failing to
proxide motorcycles that conformed to all federal standards).
SSee e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 7 (1995) ("In cases of doubt... the price at which a
merchant closes a contract is an excellent index of the nature and scope of his
obligation under the present section.").
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more detailed attention below).
Before moving on, one final characteristic of the law of implied
warranties (which is shared with the law of express warranties)
deserves particular mention. Even if a plaintiff is able to demonstrate
that the purchased goods fall short of merchantable quality, this
showing alone does not relieve her of the task of further
demonstrating that the shortcoming was the actual and proximate
cause of her economic loss. This causation requirement-in
principle-can significantly constrain IWM litigation, particularly for
harms that are especially latent, in which the product's flaw bears only
an attenuated relationship to the putative resultant loss.
Notwithstanding this limitation, courts have not been overly exacting
in evaluating proof of causation, so long as the plaintiff is able to
demonstrate the existence of some discernible and plausible nexus
between the defect and the harm.42
2. Contracting Out
As noted above, the IWM is a thorough-going default rule, and
permits the parties to execute express agreements that alter or
displace its terms. Of course, such express provisions could cut in the
direction of either weakening or strengthening the buyer's rights
against the seller, and I address each possibility in turn.
Consider first the case of weakening the buyer's rights. The
U.C.C. provides two specific mechanisms by which a seller partially or
wholly may disclaim the IWM. Under section 2-316(2), a seller may
limit or disclaim expressly the 1WM by mentioning specifically the
word merchantability in conjunction with other meaningful, limiting
language. Whether a court ultimately grants legal effect to such
attempts hinges largely on whether the language used by the seller is
adequate to put the buyer on notice of the seller's refusal to bear the
risk of prospective product failure. The U.C.C. therefore requires that
written disclaimers and/or limitations must be conspicuous to a
reasonable buyer (e.g., by distinct typeface, location, and appropriate
headings), and that both oral and written disclaimers cannot be so
general or elliptical in their reference so as to lose coherent
meaning.43
42 WHITE & SuIMMERS, supra note 34, § 9-9, at 357-58.
43 See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 423 N.E.2d 151,
153-54 (Ohio 1981) (holding that the language, "[t]his warranty is in lieu of all other
warranties," failed as a disclaimer of all implied warranties because of its lack of
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The second approach for disclaiming the JWM-provided by
section 2-316(3)-involves the invocation of prescribed magic words,
such as "as is," "with all faults," or other terms that call attention to a
sweeping intent to disclaim implied warranties.4 4 Although the two
model phrases suggested by the section are not strictly necessary to
invoke protection, they are often sufficient, and thus represent what
might be considered a "linguistic safe harbor" for disclaiming implied
warranties. Indeed, the case law is replete with examples where a
warranty disclaimer is ruled valid under section 2-316(3) despite the
absence of the model terms from the section. In virtually every case,
courts have concluded that the disclaiming language was the
equivalent to or exceeded that measure of caution prescribed by the
safe harbors in the U.C.C.5
Although the rationale behind subsection (3) is not clear-cut, the
subsection almost surely expands the ability of sellers to disclaim
implied warranties with greater certainty relative to pre-U.C.C. cases
decided under the Uniform Sales Act.4' This very well may
correspond with the view of at least some scholars that the as-is
doctrine provides a valuable measure of assurance for sellers, who
might otherwise bear large costs to avoid unintended liability
precision about the quality of the goods).
44 U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (1995). The identical provision appears in section 406(c) of
UCITA.
4' See, e.g., O'Neil v. Int'l Harvester Co., 575 P.2d 862, 864-65 (Colo. Ct. App.
1978) (holding language that read "as is without warranty of any character expressed
or implied" was sufficient to inform buyer); Joseph Charles Parrish, Inc. v. Hill, 325
S.E.2d 595, 597 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding the statement "I accept the car in its
present condition" to be the equivalent of "as is"); Attaway v. Tom's Auto Sales, Inc.,
242 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (holding same for the words "all cars sold as is
[with] no guarantee"); First Nat'l Bank v. Husted, 205 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ill. App. Ct.
1965) (holding that the words "in its present condition" are the functional equivalent
of "as is"). But see Providence & Worcester R.R. v. Sargent & Greenleaf, Inc., 802 F.
Supp. 680, 687-88 (D.R.I. 1992) (holding that implied warranties were not effectively
disclaimed when the asserted disclaiming language failed to mention "merchantability"
and was not conspicuous).
' See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 12-6, at 430 (collecting pre-U.C.C.
authority). Indeed, it is not difficult to find post-U.C.C. cases in which courts give
effect to an "as is" clause without considering the surrounding circumstances. See, e.g.,
Trailways Fin. and Acceptance Corp. v. Euro-Flo Tours, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1227, 1230
(D.NJ. 1983) ("The language of the 'as is' provision of the contract precisely precludes
claims of misrepresentation or breach of any express or implied urranties of fitness or
merchantability."); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (holding that plaintiff accepted a car "as is" despite substantial confusion and
document inconsistency about whether the car was new or used).
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produced by a creative or error-prone court.4 7  At the same time,
however, the possibilities created by subsection (3) are not limitless.
For instance, in spite of the absence of an explicit conspicuousness
requirement under this subsection, a number of courts have
nonetheless read in that element, and require that any sweeping as-is
limitation also be sufficiently conspicuous to alert the reasonable
buyer.48
As was noted above, the default nature of the IWM does not
preclude parties from moving in the opposite direction, by
strengthening (rather than limiting) the buyer's protections. Indeed,
the U.C.C. also permits parties to augment the IWM with the inclusion
of express warranties creating a reasonable expectation of additional
seller obligations. The communicative means by which such express
warranties come into being can be quite varied, and include not only
direct oral or written affirmations, but also simple description, or even
the qualitative characteristics manifested by a sample of the purchased
goods. 9
As one might expect, a fair amount ofjudicial ink has been spent
on the distinction between a warranty-creating affirmation (or
equivalent communication) and inconsequential "puffing" by a seller.
Perhaps equally unsurprising is the lack of clear doctrinal distinction
between the two (notwithstanding this inordinate attention). Indeed,
two well-known commentators note that "one who reads a few cases
gets the strong impression that the puff [versus] warranty conclusion
is only the product of an unobserved and subtle analysis that has to do
with the reasonableness of the plaintiff's reliance, the seriousness of
the plaintiffs injury, and other similar factors.""' Accordingly,
perhaps, the distinguishing elements that do (surreptitiously) emerge
from the doctrine share many of the hallmarks of warranty disclaimers
(albeit in the reverse direction). Greater degrees of formality,
directness, precision, and conspicuousness in the seller's assertion all
favor an ultimate judicial finding of an express warranty."' Ultimately,
then, the determination comes down to an often thinly articulated
47 SeeE. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS § 4.26, at 296 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that
in the presence of such risks, sellers could be expected to engage in wasteful efforts of
redrafting).
48 See, e.g., Patton v. McHone, 822 S.W.2d 608, 616-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding "the as-is language must be conspicuous... and must be contained on a form
affixed to the side window of the car").
9 U..C. § 2-313 (1995).
0 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 9-4, at 335.
51 Id.
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and opaque judgment about context.
Contextual assessments such as these are perhaps at their sharpest
in the curiously common case in which a contract contains both an
express warranty and an express disclaimer thereof. In such a case,
when the seller's signals seem to be at cross purposes, courts have
relatively few choices. While they are sometimes able to craft
harmonious interpretations of the competing terms (as indeed the
U.C.C. so instructs them'2 ), the more frequent outcome appears to
come down to choosing which of the two competing clauses to nullify,.
Here, the U.C.C. instructs courts to resolve ambiguities in a manner
that denies legal effect to an attempted disclaimer when in the
presence of a cognizable express warranty.)3 While this tie-breaking
rule certainly appears to favor buyers, one must keep in mind that it
preserves a fairly wide berth for judicial maneuvering. Indeed, as
noted above, the existence of a legally enforceable express warranty
hinges on a contextual, all-things-considered determination of the
buyer's reasonable expectations. The very inclusion of a conspicuous
disclaimer can (and frequently does") lead courts to conclude that no
express warranty existed to begin with, and therefore that the seller's
representations never became part of the so-called basis of the
bargain. This substantial interpretive freedom, of course, can often
be counterproductive because-as some scholars have argued-it
spawns an unpredictable and costly form of legal arbitration that is of
little value to many buyers.)5
B. Securities Law
Although contractual warranties represent a significant example
of how the law regulates (and sometimes refuses to regulate)
disclosures within a market setting, perhaps a more notorious set of
examples can be found in securities law. Indeed, both state and
federal securities law contain numerous forms of disclosure
regulations. Some regulations literally compel issuers to disclose
material information that might bear on the future market value of
U.C.C. §2-316(1).
Id.
A SeeNWHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 12-3, at 417-18 (showing that courts tend
to view the presence of a disclaimer as an absence of warranty).
Se, e.g., Victor Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CONRACT LKw 74, 76 (Anthony P. Kronman & Richard A. Posner eds.,
1979).
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their securities. Other regulations, on which I shall concentrate
below, govern inaccuracies, omissions, and fraud in the actual
disclosures themselves (whether compulsorily or voluntarily made).7
Among antifraud regulations, one observes both judicially or
legislatively created safe harbors that protect at least certain types of
disclosure (especially within the Rule lOb-5 context). Two particularly
important, well-known, and sweeping examples of such safe harbors
within federal law deserve particular attention: the judicially crafted
doctrine popularly known as the "bespeaks caution doctrine," and the
statutory safe harbor promulgated by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA" or "Reform Act")."' Each of these safe
harbors regulates liability solely for forward-looking projections (as
opposed to existing or historical facts59) made by a defendant.
Moreover, much like the "as is" doctrine in warranty law, each of them
works to immunize a defendant from liability should her prospective
representations prove incorrect. I shall address each of them below,
in turn.
1. The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine
As far as evolutionary narratives go, the development of law
regulating forward-looking disclosures is a winding and interesting
tale. Indeed, the SEC discouraged (and sometimes prohibited)
forward-looking projections for roughly the first forty years of its
existence. By the latter half of the 1970s, however, the SEC had
changed its policy stance and began to encourage at least limited
prospective disclosure by promulgating limited safe harbors for
certain forward-looking statements contained in documents filed with
56 For example, Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of certain
predictive information in the Management Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A") section
of an annual report. 17 C.FR. §§ 229.10. Similarly, the SEC requires disclosure of
forward-looking information in a going-private transaction on Schedule 13E-3 (Item
9). 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.0-1.
5 As noted in the Introduction, supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text, my
analysis focuses most centrally on legal rules governing false disclosures rather than
those mandating disclosure.
58 Pub. L. No. 104-67, §§ 21E, 27A, 109 Stat. 737, 749-52, 753-56 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (Supp. IV 1998)). These two examples are far from the only safe
harbors in federal law (not to mention state law). I concentrate on these two
principally, however, because of their overall importance and reach.
The distinction between forward-looking disclosures and disclosures about
existing facts is an elusive one in and of itself, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
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the SEC.' These regulatory safe harbors, however, proved relatively
inconsequential, both because of their modest reach, and because
they were subject to a permissive "reasonability" scienter standard that
plaintiffs could often finesse to defendants' motions for dismissal or
for summary judgment. From the shadow of this environment of
limited protection grew a somewhat more liberal safe harbor, created
not by the SEC or Congress, but rather by a string of precedents
within the courts themselves. The so-called "bespeaks caution
doctrine" ("BCD") is a judicially created safe harbor for securities
fraud disclosures first developed in the late 1980s. Now adopted in
some form or another within every federal circuit to have considered
it, 0 the BCD is widely identified as the first safe harbor doctrine of
general applicability for regulating disclosures of information by
issuers. Although its precise contours vary by circuit, the kernel of the
doctrine teaches that the disclosure of forward-looking information
which is accompanied by "meaningful cautionary language" about the
information's speculative nature is deemed immaterial as a matter of
law. Such a conclusion has obvious legal significance: indeed, in
order to be actionable, virtually all private rights of action under
federal securities law require a plaintiff to demonstrate the materiality
of the misstated information at issue.6
Most notably, the SEC promulgated Rule 175 under the 1933 Act, see 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.175 (2000), and Rule 3b-6 under the 1934 Act, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2000).
0 See, e.g., Stavroffv. Meyo, No. 95-4118, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 32774, at *20 (6th
Cir. Nov. 12, 1997) (stating that the defendants had no obligation to disclose
information they were not required by law to divulge under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); Grossman v.
Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); In re Burlington Coat
Factory, 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103
F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1205-
06 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399, 399
(11th Cir. 1995) (same); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994)
(same); Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
detailed cautionary language was present so that the plaintiffs had no basis to bring a
federal securities fraud claim); see also Scott v. Steingold, No. 97 C 7871, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15810, at *22-*25 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998) (holding that the plaintiff pleaded
elements of fraud under section 10(b) with sufficient particularity to meet the
heightened standard in fraud cases); In re Boeing Sec. Litig., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179
(W.D. Wash. 1998) (dismissing the plaintiffs' claims of accounting fraud); Schaffer v.
Evoling Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1223 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that the alleged
failure to disclose financial statements was pleaded with sufficient particularity to bring
a fraud claim under section 10(b)).
With the exception of section 12(a)(1) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1994 &
Supp. IV 1998), all other major federal private rights of action for disclosure-oriented
securities fraud require that the plaintiff demonstrate materiality. See, e.g., TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate
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Two important conditions historically have constrained
defendants attempting to invoke the BCD. First, the doctrine
stubbornly resists any formulaic approach as to what constitutes
"meaningful cautionary language." Courts consistently have held that
routine, rehearsed, or boilerplate language (for example, "because of
inherent market risk, your results may vary") fall short of invoking
63protection. Rather, the requisite quantum of cautionary language
under the BCD is inherently contextual, and must be tailored to
specific future projections, estimates, or opinions challenged by the
plaintiff, to affect the "total mix" of information provided to
reasonable investors.64
Second, even in those cases in which tailored and seemingly
sufficient cautionary language attends a projection, at least some
courts employing the BCD may still ultimately grant the plaintiff
relief. A number of courts treat such language as merely a factor to be
weighed along with others in determining whether the statement
constituted an important factor in a reasonable investor's decision to
invest.! Still others would deny protection under the BCD if a
defendant knowingly made false forward-looking statements, even
materiality in the section 14(a) proxy fraud context and specifying a test therefor); see
also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (adopting the same materiality test for
section 10(b) plaintiffs); it re Caterpillar, Inc., SEC Administrative Proceeding File No.
3-7692 (1992) (imposing a materiality requirement on Item 303 disclosures pursuant
to section 13(a) of the '34 Act).
63 See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 183 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that press releases predicting earnings restatement were not accompanied by
sufficient cautionary language and that general statements about risks were not
"sufficiently substantive and tailored to satisfy the requirements of the bespeaks
caution doctrine"); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 82 F.3d 877, 884 n.9 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that generalized warnings in a secondary offering prospectus, such as "some
assumptions will inevitably not materialize," were so amorphous as to be meaningless);
Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that general
disclaimers in SEC filings of the risks inherent in FDA approval insufficiently qualified
the defendant's sanguine prognostications under the BCD).
64 In re Donald Trump, 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993). This contextual test is (as
one would expect) derivative of the most general materiality test for federal securities
fraud violations: that is, that there must be a "substantial likelihood that the disclosure
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the total mix of information made available." TSC Indus., 426 U.S.
at 449.
65 See Rubenstein, 20 F.3d at 167 (holding that "cautionary language is not
necessarily sufficient ... to render predictive statements immaterial as a matter of
law"); In re Donald Trump, 7 F.3d at 373 (refusing to establish a "sweeping rule that
cautionary statements will always render misrepresentations or omissions immaterial as
a matter of law" and insisting that the emphasis was on the context in which the
statements were made).
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when accompanied by an adequate precatory disclaimer.66
Nevertheless, the bespeaks caution doctrine has proven to be an
important and general form of safe harbor for prospective disclosures.
Much like warranty disclaimers, the BCD ultimately requires courts to
determine whether (and to what extent) the overall content of an
issuer's disclosure puts buyers on notice that the seller is unwilling to
bear the risk that specific representations (and associated
assumptions) will not be realized. Indeed, at least one federal court
has made the analogy between BCD and warranty law explicit, holding
that, under the BCD, "projections of future performance not worded
as guarantees are generally not actionable under the federal securities
laws."' 7  Moreover, as we shall see below, despite the subsequent
promulgation of a statutory safe harbor in the PSLRA, the BCD is still
relatively vibrant and important, both in interpreting the statutory safe
harbor and as the chief form of protection for defendants who are
exempted specifically from the Act.
2. Reform Act
Notwithstanding the presence of a maturing bespeaks caution
doctrine, by the mid-1990s Congress had become convinced that
liability risks were sufficiently significant to have an inefficient
"chilling effect" on the willingness of issuers (particularly within the
high-technology industry) to disclose projections to the marketplace.
A chief motivation for this conclusion was the perceived
unpredictability of the BCD when administered by judges who
themselves could fall prey to systematic errors of judgment causing
them to find fraud only with the benefit of hindsight.8 This
conviction led to the passage, over a presidential veto, of the Private
11 See Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[A]llegations that
defendants made specific promises to induce a securities transaction while secretly
intending not to carry them out.., are sufficient... to state a claim for relief.. ").
0 Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
Im Indeed, part of the explicit rationale for the Act was the apprehension that a
theory of "fraud by hindsight" would become commonplace in securities litigation.
Such a theory (which is a distant cousin of the well-known "fraud on the market"
strategy) would argue that a precipitous drop in share price should constitute
presumptive evidence that issuers actively concealed the prospects for bad news in
their earlier projections. William S. Feinstein, Pleading Securities Fraud with
Particularity-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in the Rule lOb-5 Context: Kowal v. MCI
Communications Corporation, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 851, 857 (1995). For more on
the psychological theory of hindsight bias, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive
Psychological Theory ofJudgingin Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998).
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Securities Litigation Reform Act in December 1995.
69
Although the Reform Act introduced a number of important
changes to securities law (including, for example, heightened
pleading requirements, compulsory Rule 11 inquiries, and limited
discovery stays), the most important reform for the purposes of the
instant analysis was its promulgation of a formal, statutory safe harbor
for forward-looking statements.70 The safe harbor provision (which is
codified into both the '33 and '34 Acts) limits the liability exposure of
issuers and their authorized agents who disclose forward-looking
projections or assumptions pertaining thereto that later prove
incorrect.
The range of forward-looking statements falling within the
statutory safe harbor is relatively broad, and includes any written and
oral projections7' about prospective performance, such as: (1) specific
financial projections as to revenues, income, earnings, capital
expenditures, capital structure, or dividends; (2) general financial
projections about the company's future financial performance; (3)
managerial projections about future goals, operations, or products
and services; and (4) any statements about underlying assumptions
that bear on the above projections.72
At the same time, however, Congress specifically excluded from
protection a number of potential defendants thought to pose
particular risks of fraud or abuse. Thus, the statutory safe harbor is
inapplicable to initial public offerings, penny-stock issuances, rollup
transactions, tender offers, and going private transactions (among
others). 73 Also exempt from protection are "naughty" actors who,
during the previous three-year period, were found in violation of
securities laws, were subject to securities law cease-and-desist orders, or
were convicted of various crimes of moral turpitude (such as bribery
and extortion).74
69 See JAmEs HAMILTON, PRIVATE SECURITIEs LITIGATION REFORM AcT OF 1995:
LAW & EXPLANATION 11 (1996) (recounting the history of the Act's passage).
70 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (Supp. IV 1998).
71 In particular, written projections can include MD&A in Forms 10-K and 10-Q
and any outside review that makes forward-looking statements when the reviewer is
retained by the company to assess the company's forward-looking statements.
72 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(i) (1).
73 Id. § 77z-2(b). Other exemptions include offerings by blank-check companies,
disclosures made pursuant to beneficial ownership statements under section 13(d) of
the '34 Act, statements included in financial statements complying with GAAP, and
statements made by an investment company. Id.
74 Id.
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In spite of these limitations, defendants who qualify for the Act's
safe harbor may find a veritable gold mine of protection. Indeed, the
statute provides two, apparently alternative, means by which potential
defendants can avoid liability. The first alternative, which is clearly
fashioned after the bespeaks caution doctrine, shields from liability
any statement that is specifically identified as a forward-looking
statement, so long as that statement is "accompanied by meaningful
cautionary statements identifr4ng important factors that could cause
actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement."7:' But even if an issuer fails to identify its projections as
forward-looking and/or fails to couch them in the requisite
cautionary language, the Act allows for an alternative means of
protection through a heightened scienter standard. In particular, the
second prong of the statutory safe harbor shields a defendant from
liability unless the plaintiff can show that the disclosing party issued
projections with "actual knowledge" of their falsity. Proving a lesser
state of mind (such as recklessness) for the disclosing party is now
apparently insufficient Both of these prongs have proven to be
influential in post-Act litigation. I therefore address each in turn.
a. The "Cautionaiy Language Prong"
Because the cautionary language prong of the statutory safe
harbor closely resembles the BCD, the consensus expectation of
commentators at the time of passage was that this portion of the Act
would closely track the BCD case law. To a relatively large extent, this
expectation has proven to be correct, but there are a number of
caveats to this prognosis. First, unlike the BCD precedent, the
statutory case law seems to be evolving in a fashion that is at least
slightly more receptive to formulaic colonization. For instance, at
least two courts have refused to grant safe harbor protection to a
defendant whose projections, while accompanied by the requisite
cautionary language, were not specifically identified as "forward-
75 Id. § 77z-2 (c) (1) (A) (i).
See. e.g., Gross v. Medaphis Corp., 977 F. Supp. 1463, 1471 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(avoiding a direct decision on the issue of recklessness but implying that more
consciously fraudulent acts would have to be alleged); Rasheedi v. Cree Research, Inc.,
[1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99, 566 (M.D. N.C. Oct. 7, 1997),
available at 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16968, at *6 ("Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, the
Dufendants do not have to caution against every conceivable factor that may cause
results to differ.").
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looking" statements. 77  On the other hand, courts have largely
retained the general doctrinal proposition that mere "boilerplate"
warnings that do not identify specific risks are insufficient to get past
the first prong of the statutory safe harbor.78
Be that as it may, the Reform Act certainly has spawned a fairly
common practice of issuing formulaic, boilerplate warnings.
Although neither the language of the Reform Act nor the SEC
provides specific guidance or examples for what constitutes
"meaningful cautionary language,"78 a number of nearly canonical
models have now become commonplace. One of the more popular
(though less than creative) approaches in SEC filings is to include a
separate heading entitled, "Cautionary Forward-Looking Statement,"
followed by the following language: "The Company hereby identifies
the following important factors which could cause the Company's
actual financial results to differ materially from any such results which
might be projected, forecast, estimated or budgeted by the Company
or its officers or employees in forward-looking statements."""
Press releases typically follow a similar approach:
Statements contained herein which are not historical facts are forward-
looking statements. The forward-looking statements in this press release
are made pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements involve a
number of risks and uncertainties including, but not limited to, product
demand, pricing, market acceptance, risk of dependence on third party
suppliers, intellectual property rights and litigation, risks in product and
technology development and other risk factors detailed in the
Company's Securities and Exchange Commission Filings.8
See Blum v. Semiconductor Packaging Materials Co., No. CA. 97-7018, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6868, at *6 n.2 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1998) (declining to give safe harbor status
to the statements in press releases, although they were "forward-looking," because the
statements were not "'identified' as forward-looking... and they were not 'accom-
panied by meaningful cautionary statements"' (citation omitted)); Robertson v.
Strassner, 32 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450 (S.D. Tex. 1998) ("[I]nclusion of some cautionary
language in a company's disclosures is 'not enough to support a determination as a
matter of law that defendant's statements were not misleading.'" (citation omitted)).
78 In reBoeing Sec. Litig., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1169 (W.D. Wash. 1998).
79 Indeed, the SEC has strongly resisted the urge to provide either good or bad
models of cautionary language, fearing that either example would be prone to
exploitation by potential plaintiffs or defendants. See SEC Staff Has Some Constraints in
Providing Guidance on Safe Harbor, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), Nov. 7, 1997, at d3.
80 SeeJay B. Kasner, The Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 2000, at 133, 184 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series, PLI Order No. B0-OONV, 2000).
p, Id. at 185.
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Whether courts over time will tend to be more receptive to such
boilerplate approaches than they are under the BCD largely remains
to be seen. Likewise, whether the scienter requirement for
defendants is likely to be eroded under the first prong also remains to
be seen. Indeed, reading the statute textually (not to mention the
Conference Committee Report on the safe harbor provision), the
cautionary language prong contains no express teleological
component. Thus, protection under this prong would not apparently
turn on whether the speaker actually or constructively knew whether
the projection was false or misleading at the time of disclosure. While
most courts have resisted this textualist reading in favor of the
traditional BCD approachf it is still relatively up for grabs. As such, it
remains a potentially significant (though largely untested) departure
from pre-Act doctrine.
Finally, it is worth noting that the cautionary language prong of
the statutory safe harbor also retains the pre-1995 conception of
"materiality." As before, satisfactory cautionary language will
essentially have the effect of rendering the disclosure immaterial as a
matter of law. But even when the language is insufficiently cautious,
the content of the disclosure itself may be deemed immaterial if a
reasonable investor would not have thought the true information
important at the time she made her investment. As with the pre-1995
doctrine (and warranty law), then, severe or obvious forms of
"puffery" are unlikely to constitute material disclosures.
b. The Scienter Prong
The scienter prong of the statutory safe harbor is undoubtedly the
more profound departure from the BCD (at least as it is
conventionally understood). Simply put, it provides that a
defendant-regardless of whether she has complied with the
cautionary language prong-can avoid liability unless the plaintiff can
prove actual knowledge of the statement's falsity at the time that it was
made."
Id. at 166.
&, #.g., ABF Capital Mgmt. v. Askin Capital Mgmt., 957 F. Supp. 1308, 1325
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("No cautionary statements can immunize the defendants if they knew
or recklessly disregarded that these representations were false at the time they were
made." (citations omitted)).S e' Bryant v. Axado Brands, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1374 (M.D. Ga. 2000)
(stating that even in the absence of meaningful cautionary language, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that defendants had actual knowledge that statements were false when
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This level of scienter clearly eclipses that which implicates other
securities fraud claims that fall outside the statutory safe harbor
(though the precise scienter standard for these cases is now
infamously in a state of interjurisdictional flux). 5 Moreover, the
import of the elevated scienter requirement compounds further still
when viewed alongside two other major components of the 1995
Reform Act. First, all private-action plaintiffs are now required to
plead "with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
defendant acted with the requisite state of mind."'6 Explicitly, the
plaintiff must specify separately each alleged misleading statement,
giving precise reasons why it was misleading. Such elevated pleading
requirements make it more difficult to surpass preliminary judicial
scrutiny for any level of scienter, no less one that requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate actual knowledge. Second, the Act imposes a mandatory
discovery stay pending motions to dismiss, presenting additional
obstacles for plaintiffs who hope to use the discovery process to
amend their complaints.
made); Gross v. Medaphis Corp., 977 F. Supp. 1463, 1473 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ("Even if
forward-looking statements are not accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements,
defendants are insulated from liability if the plaintiff cannot show that the forward-
looking statements were made by or with the approval of an executive officer of the
company who had 'actual knowledge' that they were false or misleading.").
5 Indeed, for such non-safe-harbor cases, the exact quantum of scienter required
has become an item of disagreement among the circuit courts. The Second and Third
Circuits require that a "plaintiff may plead scienter by alleging either facts establishing
motive to commit fraud and opportunity . . . or facts constituting circumstantial
evidence of either recklessness or conscious behavior." In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig.,
180 F.3d 525, 525 (3d Cir. 1999); see Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538
(2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the pleading may allege either motive and opportunity or
"circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness"). When the
Reform Act was enacted in 1995, the Second Circuit interpreted the Reform Act as
having raised the standard to the level they had already been using and thus continued
as they had been. Press, 166 F.3d at 537-38. The Second Circuit test was considered to
be the most restrictive in the country before the Reform Act, but now may be the
weakest. The Sixth Circuit, interpreting the Reform Act differently, adopted a more
stringent test, requiring direct proof sufficient to create "a strong inference of
recklessness, but not by alleging facts merely establishing that a defendant had the
motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud." In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999). Finally, the Ninth Circuit, again interpreting the
Reform Act to have raised the pleading requirement bar previously set by the Second
Circuit, adopted the harshest test of all, asserting that a "plaintiff... must plead, in
great detail, facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless
or conscious misconduct." In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974
(9th Cir. 1999).
86 Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. IV 1998).
87 In reSunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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C. Reflections on the Doctrine
As the various examples above illustrate, both contract law and
securities law have implicit safe harbor principles within them that
shield potential defendants from liability contingent on a court's
interpretation of an initial disclosure. A common thread running
through all of them is that the content of the legal disclosure rule
plays an important role in shaping and justif ing expectations among
eventual purchasers. Thus, most of the safe harbor doctrines and
statutes considered above hinge primarily on whether, all things
considered, the defendant's disclosure is sufficient to put reasonable
buyers on notice about the specific speculative risks that attend the
purchase. If the defendant's signal appears excessively optimistic,
scantly accounting for possible downside risks or future variability, the
protection of the safe harbor is unlikely to be available. In some
sense, then, courts in all of these cases are attempting to measure the
content of a defendant's disclosure against a threshold standard that
triggers liability.
Such patterns are common throughout corporate and securities
law. Indeed, although not addressed separately above, there are
numerous other areas of corporate practice where similar threshold
assessments about the adequacy of disclosure play critical roles. The
fiduciary duty of loyalty, for example, strongly discourages self-
interested transactions between fiduciaries and their corporations.
Such transactions are voidable unless the fiduciary has adequately
"cleansed" her conflict of interest, using one of three generally
available techniques. Two of these techniques involve disclosure and
authorization by disinterested directors or by shareholders." As with
the examples offered above, there is a persistent debate in the case
law over what constitutes a safe harbor for such prior disclosures (such
as whether a fiduciary may simply disclose the material facts of the
transaction, or must specifically warn against its potential one-
sidedness). ' A similar debate likewise imbues cases in which
fiduciaries have attempted to cleanse a breached duty of care by
disclosure and subsequent approval."
- See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991) (enumerating disclosure requirements
for interested directors).
See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE L W §§ 5.2-.3, at 167-79 (1986)
(collecting authorities discussing the Delaware law of self-dealing by directors).
. See, e.g., hi reWheelabrator Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch.
1995) (holding that a fully informed shareholder vote did not extinguish the
shareholders' duty of loyalty claim but did extinguish their breach of duty of care
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Within each of these applications, liberalizing a safe harbor is
tantamount to relaxing the substantive threshold that separates
"cheap" and "expensive" talk, thereby expanding the universe of
signals a defendant may send without fear of liability. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, then, a common normative justification for safe
harbors throughout appears to be the looming specter of judicial
error.9' The safe harbor creates a certain (or at least less uncertain)
margin for engaging in cheap talk-that is, disclosures that do not
trigger future liability risks.
Although cheap talk may seem inefficient (or at least superfluous)
on first blush, it very well may prove to be part of an apt substitute for
legal regulation if norms of disclosure are sufficiently strong. Indeed,
it is at least possible that disclosing parties may, over time, develop
habits for honesty (animated by reputational, altruistic, or other
reasons) and would consequently tend to make truthful disclosures
even in the absence of fraud liability. Some scholars have argued that
such norms of disclosure actually have taken root since the passage of
the Reform Act. Johnson et al., for example, argue that the frequency
of disclosures of hard protections among a sample of high-technology
companies increased significantly after the promulgation of the
statutory safe harbor, with no significant effect on overall accuracy.
This leads them to conclude that relaxing the intensity of the
litigation environment surrounding firms need not have deleterious
effects on firms' willingness to make voluntary and accurate
disclosures of forward-looking information.9
Standing alone, however, these observations do not provide much
of a theoretical account of how legal rules should account for the
possible presence of strong norms. In particular, they do not tell us
much about the extent to which legal rules and truth-telling norms
interact with one another. In order to make any steps toward
understanding this interaction, it is necessary to delve more deeply
into the theoretical underpinnings of disclosure, safe harbors, and
norms. It is to this task I now turn.
II. A MODEL OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
The previous Part argued that safe harbors governing information
disclosure have come to play an increasingly significant role within a
claim).
91 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
92 Johnson et al., supra note 12, at 224.
DISCLOSURE NORMS 9S
number of corporate contexts. Explicitly, it illustrated what appear to
be two of the chief policy justifications for the existence (and recently,
the liberalization) of such safe harbor doctrines: first, that at least in
contexts in which information is soft, speculative, and difficult to
verify, the likelihood of judicial error severely dampens the law's
deterrent power, perhaps even to the point of rendering legal
regulation counterproductive; and second, that in such contexts,
extralegal sanctions may hold a comparative advantage over
adjudication in achieving optimal deterrence, further justifying the
move towards nonintervention.
This Part seeks to evaluate these dual claims more rigorously,
using theoretical tools drawn from game theory. By employing a
formal model of information disclosure, I endeavor to illustrate the
central arguments of this Article. First, consistent with the common
isdom, I argue that the risk of judicial error, if sufficiently large,
probably supports a less interventionist approach by courts, all else
held constant. Second, and more interestingly, however, the
introduction of extralegal norms of honesty need not strengthen the
argument for nonintervention (as many analysts implicitly assume)."'
Indeed, the example I develop below demonstrates that norms can
have exactly the opposite effects.
While the first of these conclusions is largely consistent with the
existing literature, the second is somewhat more counterintuitive, and
therefore it may be helpful to pause at this juncture and reiterate the
basic intuition that animates my analysis. As viewed from a utilitarian
perspective, truth-telling norms have the effect of imposing additional
nonlegal sanctions on any seller who misleads other market
participants."4  Consequently, as norms of honesty become increas-
ingly salient, they are able to shoulder a greater portion of the
detenent burden, thereby permitting courts to relax legal penalties
without undermining society's overall deterrence goals. Critically,
however, because norm-based sanctions are not subject to (at least
some) errors that often hamper third-party adjudicators, the process
of dampening legal sanctions will also reduce the aggregate costs of
risk due to error borne by market participants. This observation is
pivotal: since milder legal sanctions reduce error costs, courts can
afford simultaneously to be more aggressive in specifying the universe
.6 Se v spra note 12 (providing examples of this more conventional approach).
,, This might be accomplished, for example, through reputation, nonlegal
punishment, guilt, shame, and the like. The necessity of distinguishing between these
various sources of norms for current purposes is addressed infra at note 142.
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of contingencies that create liability in the first place. In other words,
by doing some of the deterrence work that would otherwise be
relegated to damages, honesty norms ironically permit courts to
expand law's reach even as they weaken its grasp.
Throughout the analysis that follows, I shall develop a relatively
simple, game-theoretic framework for analyzing information
disclosure in markets in the presence of adverse selection problems.
For the sake of simplification, this model will abstract considerably
from certain of the complexities in the doctrines described above and
focus solely on how the law can address information problems in
relatively simple negotiations between a single uninformed buyer and
a single informed seller. Initially, I shall assume that extralegal norms
of honesty are absent in this market, concentrating solely on the
interaction between information disclosure, liability regimes, and
judicial error. After these tasks are complete, I shall consider the
effect of introducing extralegal norms, demonstrating how such
phenomena may plausibly complement legal liability.
A. On Models, Reality, and 'Tit"
As noted above, the model I employ for the analysis follows a
relatively simple structure based on a negotiation between a single
buyer and single seller over an asset whose characteristics are privately
known by the seller. This framework captures the important elements
of many contracting problems, but it necessarily suppresses a fair
amount of institutional detail. This simplification may be particularly
striking in the securities fraud context, which tends to involve a
number of complexities not reflected by a simple model. Before
moving on with the detailed analysis, then, a few comments about the
"fit" between the model developed below and securities markets are
appropriate.
A common objection to the use of economic models in legal
analysis is that they are unrealistic: They often fail to capture the
factual nuances that pervade real-world situations, a failure that (to
some) renders their results untrustworthy.9 In many respects, this
criticism is altogether accurate. At the same time, however, the
realism criticism misses one of the principal purposes of using models
95 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors
Bradley and Rosenzweig 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 109 (1992) (arguing that the unrealistic
assumptions of perfect markets and zero transaction costs render any theory based on
such assumptions "false").
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in the first place. Any model of behavior-whether it is motivated
through economic intuitions or something else-is, by definition, a
deliberate simplification. Its very purpose is to isolate the most
intuitively compelling characteristics about a problem and to study
their mutual interaction. Done thoughtfully, such an approach
facilitates deductive reasoning and precise insights, which can spawn
new intuitions about the problem-intuitions that frequently elude
strictly empirical or descriptive analyses. These intuitions, in turn, can
play a role (though perhaps not an exclusive one) in informing
subsequent policy choices.
To be sure, one should never be cavalier about making simplifying
assumptions. Indeed, a well-designed model, at the very least, should
take significant care to capture the central aspects of the problem at
issue.'t Failure to do so, while not rendering the resulting theory
"false," does limit its usefulness as a practical matter. Consequently,
because securities law tends to exhibit a number of peculiar
complexities not present in ordinary contractual environments, it is
well worth considering whether and to what extent the analysis that
follows is able to capture at least some of the central tensions at play
in securities markets.
Three possible differences between contract and securities law
seem particularly important. First, while contractual contexts usually
concern pre-sale disclosures made by sellers, the lion's share of
securities fraud charges involve allegations of fraudulent projections
subsequent to the initial sale of securities. Many fraud actions, for
example, are brought by disappointed purchasers who bought
securities through the secondary market pursuant to an overly
optimistic disclosure by the original issuer. Other (though drastically
fewer) actions are brought by disappointed sellers who sold shares to a
third party on the heels of an overly pessimistic disclosure by the
issuer. Note that in either case, the misleading forecast is not made by
the plaintiffs trading partner, but rather by an entity (the issuer) that
is external to the transaction.
Second, securities fraud complaints frequently involve statements
that technically are not made by the issuer itself (which is often a
corporation), but rather by its officers and directors (most typically),
or some combination of fiduciaries, authorized employees,
Moreover, a well-designed model should clearly distinguish between simplifying
assumptions (that is, those that can be relaxed without altering the qualitative results)
and critical assumptions (that is, those that cannot).
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controlling shareholders, or auditors. It may therefore be impossible
to analyze the disclosure incentives of an "issuer" without first looking
into the incentives of the actual individuals who speak on its behalf,
and who are themselves involved in an agency relationship at the
company.
And finally, unlike contract law (in which contractual instruments
are often thought to be bargained for face-to-face), public securities
markets are largely thought to constitute contexts in which
prospective shareholders are not allowed to bargain (except, perhaps,
with their feet). This inability for shareholders to "fend for
themselves" with express contractual terms is presumably whatjustifies
the existence and enforcement of securities laws that provide such
protection.9'
The upshot of these caveats is that, in spite of its similarities to
contractual environments (on which the model below is based),
securities law may entail factual contexts that are quite distinct from a
simple buyer-seller relationship. Indeed, thinking seriously about
securities fraud requires one to consider the incentives and behavior
of distinct buyers, sellers, disclosing entities, and agents who speak on
behalf of such entities. Within simple contractual scenarios, in
contrast, the latter three are frequently coextensive. Add to this the
purchaser's inability to bargain personally with issuers, and the
practice of lumping the two contexts together on the basis of their
similarities may be asking too much.
Although these caveats are well-taken, I ask the reader's
indulgence in allowing me to pursue my inclination to lump, for the
following reasons. Consider first the possibility that the securities law
context is different because of an intrafirm agency relationship (that
is, the second distinction noted above). Here, it seems, contract and
securities contexts actually have many more similarities than
differences. Indeed, it is probably a great exaggeration to claim that
"tmost" or even "many" commercial contract and/or warranty disputes
involve an individual rather than a corporate entity. Virtually all
consumer warranty and due diligence disputes involve allegations of
inadequate disclosures by a business entity itself, even though the
actual representation is obviously made by an authorized agent of the
entity. To be sure, it is often important to ask whether agency costs
97See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) ("[T]he
applicability.., should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need
the protection of the Act.").
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systematically distort the sorts of disclosures that authorized agents are
likely to make to the market, but this consideration is not a factor that
necessarily distinguishes contract from securities law.
Similarly, the presence or absence of face-to-face bargaining is not
always a defining distinction between a contract and a security.
Indeed, it is not difficult to find examples of contracts that involve
little or no face-to-face bargaining, but nonetheless are regulated
solely by contract law. Most consumer warranties, for example, are
the product of "take it or leave it" offers by sellers, leaving little room
for the buyer to dicker over precise terms while at the checkout
counter. From the other direction, many forms of securities also
legitimately qualify as contracts, and are therefore regulated under
both regimes. Corporate debt securities, for example, are commonly
considered to be "securities" covered by federal law and also fall
within the rubric of "debt contracts" for purposes of state law.
Consequently, the presence or absence of face-to-face bargaining does
not preordain what constitutes a contract versus a securities claim (at
least on first principles)."
This leaves one remaining distinction between contracts and
securities: that the "disclosing" entity need not be coextensive with
either the buyer or the seller in the transaction(s) at issue. To be
sure, this is a distinction that is largely unique to securities law." At
the same time, however, securities law contexts frequently do
implicate situations in which the disclosing entity is also privy to a
contract, including initial and secondary offerings, aftermarket
transactions, private placements, and going-private transactions. Each
of these contexts arguably falls within some form of safe harbor rule
governing disclosure (though not always the same one).'00
Moreover, even in those situations in which the disclosing party is
truly distinct from the trade, there may be a number of reasons to
think the firm is nonetheless motivated by similar goals as the seller-
- Ha-ing made these points, I hasten to add that the model considered below
deliberately attempts to capture the take-it-or-leave-it context of securities market
transactions. See ifra text accompanying notes 108-10.
" There are, however, notorious examples in contract law in which this distinction
eaporates. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916) (holding a
manufacturer of a defective automobile liable for product defects, notwithstanding a
lack of contractual privity with the eventual purchaser).
I, For instance, disclosures associated with IPOs, going-private transactions, and
rull-up transactions are all exempted under the 1995 Reform Act's safe harbor, though
they still arguably fall within the jurisdiction of the related "bespeaks caution"
doctrine.
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to maximize the market price of the firm's stock. Indeed, it is now
commonplace for CEOs and other corporate officers who make
disclosures to be compensated in a manner that is directly tied to
share price, either through stock options or through outright
incentive pay. Even those without explicit incentive pay may realize
implicit rewards from a high stock price, such as lucrative job offers
from competing firms. Furthermore, other practical factors may
create incentives even at the entity level for maximizing aftermarket
stock price. A firm's cost of capital, for example, frequently turns on
the existence of a thick equity cushion-the impression of which is
surely augmented by a robust share price. Thus, even in those
situations in which an issuer has no personal stake in impending
trades, it may harbor incentives very much like (if not identical to)
those of a privately informed seller.
Thus, while securities law certainly exhibits a number of
important characteristics that are distinct from contractual
environments, both scenarios nonetheless reflect incentive structures
that share a number of important common traits. Like issuers of
securities and their agents, contractual sellers have an incentive to
overstate the quality of their wares. Like financial markets, many
contractual contexts involve market transactions with little or no
bargaining. And like securities fraud actions, many contractual
disputes revolve around allegations that a party made misleading or
inadequate disclosures before the transaction occurred. While
certainly not exhaustive, these central similarities between contract
and securities law provide some justification for using a unified
framework to examine both of them. Just such a framework is
explored below.
B. Framework
Consider a seller ("she"), denoted by S, who initially owns a single
asset (described at greater length below), and is considering whether
to attempt a sale to a buyer ("he"), denoted by B. The asset could take
many conceivable forms, such as a consumer good, the goodwill
and/or assets of a business, or a financial security. The ultimate value
of the asset, however, is not a sure thing as it depends on a future state
of the world. In one state of the world, the asset will prove to be a
"success," yielding a payoff of $100 for its owner; in the other state of
the world, however, the asset will prove to be a "failure," yielding no
payoff whatsoever.
The buyer is assumed to be well-diversified and thus risk-neutral,
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and he therefore values any uncertain future payoff stream (denoted
by X) at its expected value. The seller, on the other hand, is assumed
to be risk-averse, and she thus values an uncertain payoff stream at less
than its expected value1 ' To reflect this trait, suppose that the
monetary valuation (or so-called "certainty equivalent") that S places
on X consists of its expected value, less some risk premium, which
increases with the variability of Y, To be a bit more mathematically
precise, I suppose in what follows that the seller's certainty equivalent
payoff to holding payoff stream Xis given by:
Us (X) = (Expected value of X)- k. (Variance of X)
Risk Premium
The parameter k in the above expression captures the extent to
which S is risk averse. As the value of k grows, the risk premium that S
would require for her to hold X increases accordingly.W2 Although k
could plausibly take on any range of values, for concreteness I shall
assume arbitrarily in what follows that it is equal to 1/300.
If all assets had a commonly known level of risk, it would be easy
for the buyer and seller to strike a deal in which the ownership
interest in the asset (along with all the risk) is transferred to the
buyer, who is-on account of his risk neturality-the most efficient
risk bearer. Complicating matters, however, is the fact that assets are
not homogeneous. In particular, I assume that an asset can be of low
or high quality (when viewed at the time of sale). "Low"-quality assets
have a relatively modest probability of proving successful, only 4 in 10
(or 40%). "High"-quality assets, in contrast, have a significantly more
attractive success rate of 8 in 10 (80%). For simplicity, I assume that
an asset is as likely to be of high quality as it is to be of low quality
when viewed ex ante. Thus, in the absence of any information about
the asset's quality, the expected probability of a successful payoff is
JQ For the purpose of illustrative ease, assume that S is the only risk-averse player.
In many situations, this is not an overly brave assumption. For instance, in securities
markets, the fact that most buyers are well-diversified allows them to behave as if they
are risk-neutral. Moreover, so long as the seller remains risk-averse herself, allowing
for buyer risk aversion offers no significant additional insights. I take up this possibility
again explicitly infra at note 122.
1,,2 Those familiar with the economic literature will recognize that this certainty
equivalent approximates a form of utility function that economists often use to
represent risk-averse preferences. Indeed, the certainty equivalent function denoted
in the text can be derived from a utility function exhibiting a constant absolute risk
aversion (or "CARA") of the form U(X) = A -Be"d. For such a utility function, relatively
small gambles can be represented by a certainty equivalent preference function similar
to the one in the text, where y= 2k
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simply the average of high- and low-quality success rates, or 6 in 10
(60%). Consequently, someone who is wholly uninformed about the
asset's quality might think of it as essentially a third type of asset,
which I shall hereinafter refer to as "uninformed" or "medium" in
quality.
Given this framework, it is possible to state the certainty-equivalent
payoffs that each player would receive were she the sole owner of a
high-, medium-, or low-quality asset. This information is reflected in
Table 1 below:
Asset Type S's Valuation laValuation
Low (0.40) -(100) (0.24).(100)2 $32.00 (0.40)(100)
300 = $40.00
(0.24)-(100)2 -$5200 (0.60) (100)Medium (0.60).-(100) =$
300 = $60.00
High (0.80)100)- (0.16) (100)
2 $74.67 (0.80) (100)
300 = $80.00
Table 1: Certainty Equivalents by Type of Asset
Notice from the table that for each type of asset, there are gains
from trade available. Indeed, the cumulative assumptions that (1) S is
risk-averse while B is risk-neutral, (2) the asset's ultimate value is
uncertain ex ante, and (3) once realized, the asset's value is identical
for both players, jointly imply that it would always be efficient for S to
transfer her complete ex ante interest in the asset (along with all the
risk) to the buyer.'O For reasons elaborated below, however, such a
transaction may not always be feasible.
The heterogeneity of asset types gives rise to a key tension
motivating the analysis: private information. I assume that the seller
has better information than the buyer about the type of asset that is
being sold. Explicitly, I suppose that before encountering the buyer,
the seller receives some noisy information about the likely success rate
of the asset. Two-thirds of the time this information tells her precisely
whether the asset is of low- or high-quality; the remaining one-third of
the time, the information received by S has no decipherable message
whatsoever (and therefore tells her nothing). Critically, only the
103I do not consider the possibility of debt financing in this analysis, principally
for explanatory ease. Most of the signaling considerations herein apply with equal
force to debt contracts, whenever debt holders bear some financial risk.
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seller knows for sure whether she received an informative signal, and,
if so, what its content was. The buyer is aware only of the fact that the
seller may have received an informative piece of information!.
The framework described above essentially gives rise to a signaling
game between the seller and buyer in which it is commonly known by
both S and B that there are (as viewed at the time of sale) three types
of assets-low-, medium-, and high-quality-and that each type of
asset is equally likely ex ante."'  For shorthand, I shall define a "high-
quality seller type" as a seller who knows that she possesses a high-
quality asset. I shall similarly define "medium-quality" and "low-
quality" seller types as those who possess these respective pieces of
information.
C. Verifiable Information
It is important to take note of the fact that a buyer's inability to
observe a seller's type need not, by itself, be entirely disabling. For
example, even without an independent ability to observe quality, there
may be certain types of "hard" information that buyers can verify fairly
easily once the seller has disclosed it and opens up her proverbial
"books" for inspection. For such types of information, the presence of
asymmetric information turns out to be rather unproblematic.
Indeed, even in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so, sellers
would want to disclose their information to the buyer sua sponte.
This phenomenon-known to game theorists as unraveling-can
be understood more clearly through a simple narrative. Suppose that
there were no legal disclosure requirement whatsoever. In such a
situation, the uninformed buyer would (at least on first blush) be
willing to pay no more than the mean value he perceives the asset to
be worth (or $60 in this case). Clearly, the high-quality seller would
never be willing to sell for this amount (as her own valuation of the
asset, per Table 1, is $74.67), and would initially be inclined simply to
walk away. However, the high-quality seller could do better by
revealing her information to the buyer. Indeed, if she did so, her
disclosure (once verified) would increase B's willingness to pay for the
asset from $60 up to $80-a price at which the high-quality seller type
would happily sell. Anticipating this effect, then, a high-quality seller
M1 And, implicitly, the buyer knows the probabilities associated with receiving the
afiot s signals.
1"', In other words, the asset's quality is drawn randomly from a discrete
distribution of project types, each with ex ante probability of one-third.
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would always prefer to reveal her knowledge right away.
Given that a high-quality seller would reveal that information
immediately, a rational buyer would update his assessment of the
asset's value should he receive no such disclosure. In particular, the
buyer would now be able to infer that the seller must be a medium- or
low-quality type, and accordingly would be willing to pay no more
than $50 for the asset (the average value for the medium- and low-
quality assets). Such a price, of course, would now be prohibitively
low even for the medium quality seller (who values keeping the asset
at $52). Thus, this seller now would also have an incentive to disclose
her information in order to convince the buyer that her asset is worth
$60. Hence, once she realizes that a high-quality seller would
immediately reveal her knowledge, a medium-quality seller would
always have an incentive to follow suit.
This unraveling process leaves the low-quality seller as the only
one who remains silent. But this silence is now of little moment:
From the buyer's perspective, the seller's silence unambiguously
reveals her low quality, and thus the buyer would reduce his
willingness to pay yet again to $40 should no disclosure occur. And,
moreover, the low-quality seller would happily accept this sum.
Importantly, this unraveling result gives rise to a first-best efficient
equilibrium in which all private information is shared and all types of
sellers successfully sell their entire ownership stake to the buyer."6 In
such a situation, the aggregate level of social welfare attained would
be precisely equal to the ex ante expected value of the asset, or:
I1. (0.4 + 0.6 + 0.8)x ($100) = $60.00.3
Thus, in a world in which the seller's disclosure is easily verifiable,
there is a happy story to be told (or at least an efficient one) even in
the absence of law. The only plausible outcome is one entailing full
disclosure and first-best efficiency.
On some level, perhaps, the full disclosure produced by the
unraveling phenomenon can be considered a type of norm, given that
all individuals engage in the practice without external prodding from
courts. But this account of what a norm is adds little to the notion of
a static, game-theoretic equilibrium. Indeed, full disclosure is the only
106 Although the discussion above assumes implicitly that the buyer always
purchases at a price equal to his (post-disclosure) willingness to pay, there are other
equally efficient equilibria in which the price is any value between the buyer's and
seller's valuations, as reflected in Table 1, above.
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equilibrium outcome within this strategic setting, and thus any more
nuanced view of what a norm is (for example, a selection device
among numerous equilibria, or a type of preference that admits new
equilibria) is simply inapposite.
As such, I shall not dwell on this particular case any longer, other
than to reiterate that in the presence of verifiable disclosures, strategic
incentives are so strong as to render law rather superfluous.i17 There
is, however, a much more interesting story about the interaction of
disclosure, law, and norms in those situations where a seller's
information is unverifiable. It is to those considerations I now turn.
D. Unverifiable Information
As noted above, matters become somewhat more complicated
when information is prohibitively difficult for buyers to verify. In such
instances, the unraveling phenomenon described in the previous
subsection would cease to function."" Indeed, if buyers can never
confirm the content of disclosed information, the act of disclosure is
hardly distinct (at least on first principles) from mere puffing, or
"cheap talk." This is a significant problem, capturing many real-world
transactions (within ordinary markets, financial markets, and even
intrafirm markets). For example, nonverifiability is roughly analogous
to situations in which the important attributes of a good take the form
of speculative, forward-looking, or "soft" information about the
asset-information that is difficult, if not impossible, for either the
buyer to verify at the time made, or for a court to verify ex post. The
A few caveats to this conclusion are worth flagging at this point. In particular,
there may be situations in which a seller's disclosure is verifiable, but costly for a seller
to acquire or to send. In either situation, sellers may rationally (but perhaps
inefficiently) choose not to acquire the information or to make any disclosures
whatsoever to the buyer. In such circumstances, laws forcing disclosure may sometimes
work to counteract these inefficiencies. See Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwaa et al., Strategic
Infonnation Revelation, 57 REv. ECON. STUD. 25 (1990) (providing the conditions
sufficient to guarantee complete revelation of private information but also providing
examples where complete revelation will not occur). In addition, when the content of
an individual's information is multidimensional, complete disclosure may also not
obtain in equilibrium in the absence of laws compelling such disclosure. See id. at 38-
39 (explaining why it is more profitable for a firm to conceal information than to
disclose it when its information is multidimensional). I will not dwell on this possibility
in what follous for two reasons. First, time and space constraints compel me to focus
on the more pertinent case of unverifiable (rather than costly) disclosures, a case
which turns out to exhibit some similar properties. And second, many of the most
important doctrines and statutes regulating disclosure-that is, antifraud provisions-
act not so much as to require as to regulate its content and consequences once made.
J- Id. at 37-38, 45-46.
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balance of my analysis, then, focuses on the situation in which a
seller's information is neither observable by the buyer nor verifiable in
court.
An important by-product of nonverifiability is that it may (unlike
the case of unraveling) provide a normative role for law and/or
extralegal norms. Indeed, both law and norms can help to attach
consequences to representations made by a seller. Most obviously,
even without the convenience of verifiability, S may try to send signals
to the buyer about her type. Such signals, while certainly constituting
cheap talk in a world without law or norms, might well become
meaningful in the presence of such disciplining constraints.
The subsections that follow attempt to address these questions
more explicitly. Accordingly, I shall impose the same structure as
above on the commercial interaction at issue. In all of the instances
studied below, the seller is assumed to make a take-it-or-leave-it price
offer to the buyer. Along with this offer, however, the seller may send
an unverifiable signal (that is, make a "disclosure") about the quality
of the asset she is selling. In so doing, she can send one of three
signals: first, she might disclose L, which communicates the signal, "I
have a low value asset"; second, she might disclose H, which
communicates the message, "I have a high-value asset"; or, finally, she
could disclose M, which communicates the message, "I have received
no meaningful information, and thus I have only a medium-quality
asset."' 9 Once he has received the price and signal from the seller,'
the buyer decides whether to accept or reject it, with acceptance
culminating in an immediate sale at the quoted price and rejection
culminating in an immediate cessation to the bargaining process with
the seller retaining ownership of the asset. After a sale (if any) is
consummated, chance determines whether the asset is valueless or
worth $100, according to the true underlying probabilities. The
consequences that follow from this determination, if any, will differ
according to the role played by law and/or norms of behavior. The
basic structure of the game is given by Figure 1, below. In the Figure,
nature (player N) moves first to select (at random) a seller "type" (Si,
109 In some respects, the inclusion of both a price and an information disclosure is
superfluous, given that the price quoted may itself be a signal of quality. I present
them as separate messages here, however, for the sake of clarity.
1o Importantly, the buyer does not know for sure whether a particular disclosure
(for example, H) actually came from that type of seller. Only if the underlying
incentives are appropriately calibrated will these signals be truthful ones in
equilibrium. See infra Part II.E.2.
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S, or S,). Whichever type of seller is chosen then makes a disclosure
of her type (L, Al, or B) followed by a price demand (q, qr, or a).
The buyer (B) may accept or reject this demand.
Figure 1: Extensive Form of Disclosure Game
E. The Effect of Disclosure Law
For the moment, let us postpone any discussion of norms, and
concentrate solely on whether law alone can help provide a partial
solution to problems of asymmetric, unverifiable information. As is
demonstrated below, law often can provide incentives that induce
efficient disclosure, but only if courts are not prone to substantial
errors themselves. In the presence ofjudicial error, however, not only
may legal rules fail to provide adequate incentives, but they may in
fact prove to be counterproductive.
1. Anarchy
Consider first how the market described above might work under
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a state of "anarchy"-that is, when there are no legal consequences
placed on the practice of seller disclosures." This is, in many ways,
the most severe case to consider, and accordingly it turns out that the
only plausible outcomes are those in which only the lowest-quality
seller successfully makes any transactions. In other words, anarchy
induces all other sellers to decide (inefficiently) to stay out of the
market.
In order to understand why this type of equilibrium emerges, it is
perhaps most helpful to walk the reader through a representative
one,1 12 emphasizing the relevant intuitions along the way. Most
significantly (and as one might conjecture), the absence of legal
consequences attending to disclosure gives rise to a situation in which
disclosure becomes completely uninformative, and correspondingly
all types of sellers simply decide at random which of the three possible
disclosure signals (L, M, or H) to send. To understand why
disclosures must be uninformative in equilibrium, suppose that each
of the sellers had adopted a distinct strategy of disclosing her type
truthfully. In such a case, the buyer certainly would exploit this
truthful behavior to infer which type of seller he was facing, and
would accordingly be willing to pay the most (that is, $80) when he
received the posited signal H of the high-quality seller. Knowing this,
of course, the low- and medium-quality sellers would have a strong
incentive to emulate their high-quality counterpart's signal, in an
attempt to extract this higher price. Their incentive to emulate,
however, would not be lost on the buyer, who upon hearing the signal
H, would now revise his inference downward and would be willing to
pay at most the average value of $60 for the asset. Importantly, this
revised willingness to pay now falls short of the high-quality seller's
reservation value of $74.67, and thus she would no longer wish to sell
at this price." 3 Clearly, then, our initial hypothesis of a "separating
equilibrium," in which each seller made a truthful disclosure, cannot
I Recall as well that in this Part I am holding in abeyance the possibility that
extralegal norms are at play. I shall return to this consideration below.
112 While multiple equilibria are possible in this case involving different strategies,
their outcomes are always identical.
13 It is important to note here that if (contrary to the example in the text) sellers
were extremely risk-averse (or placed no value on the asset for other reasons), then the
high-quality seller still might be willing to sell at the average price. In this case, all
sellers simply would sell at the average ex ante price of $60, which would be first-best,
and there would be no need for either law or norms. I therefore concentrate on what
I perceive to be the more interesting case in which higher-quality sellers would be
unlikely to participate in the market unless they could convince the buyer of their
quality.
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be correct. Moreover, if the high-quality seller ever attempted to
switch to a different signal, the other two seller types would just as
happily emulate that new signal, thwarting the high-quality seller's
efforts to distinguish herself. This cycling, emulatory behavior
equilibrates only if all three types of seller randomize completely
among the three possible signals, which is exactly what occurs in
equilibrium, as illustrated in the table below:
SType Signal Mkt. Price S's Payoff Inefficiency
Low L, Al, or H $40.00 $40.00 $0.00
Medium L, Al, or H None..4  $52.00 $8.00
High L, M, or H None $74.67 $6.33
Table 2: Equilibrium in Absence of Law
As a result of the seller's uninformative disclosure, the buyer
simply will ignore such signals altogether and concentrate solely on
the quoted price. In theory, of course, one optimistically might
imagine that the price demanded by the seller itself would constitute a
signal about quality. Unfortunately, however, it turns out that the
same problems as those discussed above recur to dash these hopes.
Hypothesize, for example, that each of the seller types quoted a
different price, with the high-quality seller demanding $80, the
medium-quality seller demanding $60, and the low-quality seller
demanding $40. Because the buyer would correctly infer an $80 price
to reveal high quality, the buyer would accept that offer. Knowing
this, however, the low- and medium-quality sellers would both want to
abandon their hypothesized strategies and emulate the $80 offer.
Once again, the hypothesis of distinct, acceptable price offers from
each type of seller cannot constitute an equilibrium.
In fact, it turns out that this logical story repeats itself for any
hypothesized set of price quotes in which either the medium- or high-
quality seller makes a "serious" offer.. to the buyer: were a serious
offer ever believed by the buyer in equilibrium, the low-quality seller
would immediately emulate it, causing the buyer to reduce her
willingness to pay and thereby vitiating the higher-quality seller's
"' Both the medium- and high-quality sellers would make a nonserious offer to
the buyer (such as $400) and thus there will be no transaction.
)V. By "serious" offer, I mean an offer that has a chance of being accepted. For
example, a price quote of $400 from the seller would never be taken seriously by the
buyer, since the asset's ultimate value is at most $100.
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initial incentive to make the offer. Consequently, the only serious
offer in equilibrium has to come only from the low-quality seller, who
quotes a price of $40-a price that is accepted by the buyer.,
f
For those familiar with the law and economics literature, the
strategic dynamic described above will have an extremely familiar
ring. Indeed, it is nothing more than the familiar "lemons problem"
first highlighted by George Akerloff more than a quarter century
ago." 7 Just as in his approach, the presence of private, unverifiable
information can lead to a situation in which only low-quality assets, or
"lemons," are ultimately bought and sold." 8 Owners of higher-quality
assets rationally choose to keep them off the market, unable to
convince buyers of their "true" worth.
Not only does the lemons problem deter numerous potential
trades, but it does so at the cost of reducing social welfare below its
first-best potential. In our running numerical example, for instance,
the lemons problem reduces total expected social welfare to:
1. ($40)+ 1. ($52)+ 1. ($74.67)= $55.57
3 3 3
which falls short of the first-best level (of $60) by $4.43.' 9
16 The discussion in the text contains only a verbal description of the equilibria
that emerge in this setting. For readers wishing greater precision, a plausible
sequential-equilibrium strategy is as follows: (1) all sellers randomize evenly over their
disclosure strategy; (2) the low-type seller demands a price of $40; (3) the medium-
and high-type sellers make nonserious price offers (such as $101); and (4) the buyer
accepts any offer less than or equal to $40, rejecting all others. For completeness, it is
important to specify the buyer's beliefs as well. One set of beliefs that suffices is as
follows: (1) regardless of the disclosure signal received (L, Al, or H), the buyer believes
it to have come from any seller type with equal likelihood; and (2) should the buyer
ever receive a "serious" price offer (that is, anything of $80 or less), he believes it to
have come from the low-quality seller. It is confirmed easily that this constitutes a
sequential equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to all other sequential equilibria.
For more on the precise definition of a sequential equilibrium, see David M. Kreps &
Robert Wilson, Sequential Equilibria, 50 ECONOMETRICA 863, 863-64 (1982).
117 George A. Akerloff, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
11 As noted above in note 113, if all sellers are extremely risk-averse, then all
would be willing to sell for $60, and the lemons problem would not arise.
119 One might wonder, of course, whether a meager $4.43 is really all that
important given that the potential stakes involved are in the neighborhood of $60.
Indeed, the inefficiency noted here is less than 10% of the total surplus available.
While this critique is numerically correct, it is easy to alter the example in ways that
leave it qualitatively unaffected yet magnify the extent of the inefficiency. If, for
example, the ultimate owner of the asset were required to sink an irreversible, specific
investment of $40 in order to produce any later payoff, the net value of the asset ex
post would be $0 for a low type, $10 for a medium type, and $20 for a high type. In
this case, the nominal inefficiency of the lemons equilibrium would recur, but now
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2. Introducing Law
If asymmetric information gives us lemons, can we use law to make
lemonade? The answer to this question tends to be somewhat elusive.
It turns out that the introduction of law certainly can help, but only
insofar as courts are relatively reliable. When, in contrast, courts are
prone to committing severe errors, the introduction of legal liability
can be even worse than anarchy. There are two possible ways that the
law may be able to approach the lemons phenomenon described
above. I address them each in turn.
First, and most simply, one could try to attack the lemons problem
by brute force. If, for example, courts (acting ex post) were
substantially better than capital markets (acting at the time of
disclosure) at verifying the truthfulness of seller disclosures, then one
might be able to address the lemons problem relatively easily: Simply
require disclosure by the seller in all instances, and impose stiff
penalties on any seller who, after the fact, is determined to have
misrepresented herself. This brute-force approach seems to be the
theoretical scenario that much of securities regulation has come to
reflect. To the extent that it is feasible (and relatively inexpensive),
this direct approach is both attractive and worth pursuing.
While on first blush, disclosure requirements may seem like a
panacea for lemons problems,' such solutions suffer (at least
sometimes) from significant drawbacks. Most notably, there may be
very few contexts in which courts have a comparative advantage over
securities markets at determining the truthfulness of seller disclosures.
Indeed, there are a number of reasons to think that judicial processes
are even worse at doing so.
First, the judicial inquiry requires that a court reconstruct the
knowledge possessed by the seller at the time the disclosure was made,
a task that is at least freighted with uncertainty and at most impossible,
particularly when the disclosure at issue involves "soft" information.
Second, even if a court successfully could reconstruct the seller's
knowledge at the time of disclosure, the administrative costs in
would constitute nearly 45% of the surplus potentially available. Given the ease with
which one can manipulate the relative importance of the nominal value of the
inefficiency in this example, I shall favor the simpler formulation given in the text,
focusing instead on the fraction of this inefficiency that judicial intervention can
eliminate.
)"" Indeed, many legal scholars habitually construe them as such. See, e.g., CLARK,
supia note 89, § 4.2, at 150-57 (arguing that mandatory disclosure rules are socially
efficient).
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conducting such an inquiry might render the game unworthy of the
candle. And finally, even a court that could overcome these obstacles
would have to remain vigilant against letting knowledge about
subsequent losses color its (and a jury's) inquiry into the scienter of
the seller at the time disclosure is made. It may be difficult for many
courts and juries to avoid susceptibility to hindsight bias in conducting
this assessment (a problem that largely created the perceived need for
a statutory safe harbor in the first place).2'
When these limitations are prohibitive, however, there is yet
another means by which legal rules can confront the lemons prob-
lem. Within the framework discussed above, one might simply
interpret a seller's disclosure to be a type of constructive warranty.
Consider, for example, the following legal regime: If a seller
represents her asset to be of high quality and a buyer purchases it, the
seller must stand ready to compensate the buyer in the amount of $D,
should the asset turn out to be worthless. Similarly, sellers disclosing
medium- or low-quality assets must stand ready to compensate a
disappointed buyer in the amounts of $D and $DL, respectively.
Unlike the brute-force option, this warranty-like approach does not
require an in-depth inquiry into the seller's state of mind at the time
of disclosure, and requires the court merely to mete out the
appropriate remedy in those situations.
As it turns out, such an arrangement can solve, at least partially,
the lemons problem noted above, so long as damages amounts are set
appropriately. In particular, one can manipulate the magnitude of
the respective damages to ensure that low-, medium-, and high-quality
sellers perfectly reveal their types and that the buyer purchases from
all of them. To implement such a scheme, however, it is necessary to
ensure that D is large enough relative to DL to keep the low-quality
seller from mimicking her medium-quality counterpart. In turn, one
must be sure that D, is sufficiently high relative to D, to keep the
medium-quality seller from mimicking the high-quality seller.
Finally, within these constraints lies one other important goal:
121 See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 10, at 616-17 (discussing the "heightened
pleading requirement" for securities fraud claims to prevent "fraud by hindsight," but
noting that it does not "entirely purge the system of the bias's influence"). Yet another
factor impeaching the generality of disclosure requirements is the fact that such
requirements implicitly presuppose the ultimate verifiability of the seller's
information. In such instances, there may be no need for law whatsoever, since a seller
simply can disclose the relevant information sua sponte. See supra text accompanying
note 107 (noting exceptions to the law's superfluousness in the presence of verifiable
disclosures).
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that of minimizing-to the extent possible-the collective size of the
above guarantees. Indeed, the substantive effect of this approach is to
place at least some liability risk on the seller, who (recall) is risk-
averse. Thus, this solution to the lemons problem cannot eliminate
all inefficiencies. Much like a good driver often must signal her
quality by accepting a larger deductible or lower copayment, a high-
quality seller must be illing to submit to greater liability exposure to
signal her quality. This residual risk that sellers must bear represents
a type of residual agency cost.
As a consequence of this observation, it is clear that an "efficient"
legal rule will tend to set the smallest damages level, DL, equal to zero.
Indeed, if a court were to choose some larger number, it would also
be necessary to increase both of the other damages amounts, D, and
D,, so as to preserve the differences among them that give sellers the
incentives to communicate truthfully. Doing so, however, would
inefficiently cause risk-averse sellers as a group to bear more risk than
is necessary.'" In many respects, then, setting DL = $0 is tantamount to
stipulating a "safe harbor" absolving anyone who discloses L from
future liability.2 3
Assuming then, that we fix DL = $0, let us ask what values of DM, and
D, would be optimal. Note first that the effective "guarantee" offered
by the seller who discloses either Al or H will alter the price that a
rational buyer is willing to pay. Indeed, now knowing that his
purchase is partially insured, the buyer will be willing to pay a larger
price than he hitherto would have been willing to put forward. Thus,
for example, if the buyer is sure that the signal M has come from the
medium-quality seller, then he will be willing to pay the expected
value of the asset plus the expected value of the warranty (or, $60 +
(0.4) x D 1). Similarly, a buyer who believes a signal of H has come
from a high-quality seller would be willing to pay the sum of the
expected values of the asset and the contingent legal right (or, $80 +
(0.2) x DH).
Keeping in mind this price effect, all that remains is to set the
' " Of course, if the buyer were also risk-averse, it might be efficient for the parties
to share the financial risk between them, by (for example) setting DL > D. I do not
delve further into this possibility, however, for two reasons. First, the principal
intuitions of this Article can be made without adding another layer of complexity. And
second, if the asset were divisible, buyer risk aversion would likely result in the seller
alienating only a portion of the asset, such that DL would once again be equal to zero.
'2' Note that there are alternative types of safe harbors, such as vitiating liability
for anyone who discloses either L or M; I shall take these variations up at greater
length in later sections. See infra Parts II.G, II.H.2.
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remaining damages amounts in a way that ensures that the seller
reveals her information truthfully (that is, a "separating" equilibrium).
As it turns out, the minimum damages amounts that ensure such
truthful revelation are given by D, = $76.56 and D, = $90.61. 124 At
these damages levels, a separating equilibrium will emerge, whose
central characteristics are shown in the table below:
SType Signal Dam. Amt. Mkt. Price Ss Payoff Inefficiency
Low L $0.00 $40.00 $40.00 $0.00
Medium M $76.56 $90.62 $55.31 $4.69
High H $90.61 $98.12 $75.62 $4.38
Table 3: Equilibrium Under "Optimal" Disclosure Law
There are a number of pertinent observations one can make from
this table. Note first from the second column that each of the sellers
discloses her type truthfully. Thus, the specter of legal liability
permits the sellers' information to be communicated credibly to the
market, thereby providing a signaling "solution" to the lemons
problem.
Second, the liability exposure to which the medium- and high-
quality sellers submit actually exceeds the expected value of the
underlying assets they are selling. For instance, the uninformed,
medium-quality seller must guarantee the buyer a payoff of $76.56,
even though the asset she was selling had an expected value of $60 at
the time she sold it. Similarly, the high-type seller had to guarantee
over $90 for the buyer even though the expected value of the asset was
only $80.126 At the same time, of course, the liability risk the sellers
124 These figures are computed as follows. Consider first how high D,1 needs to be
to keep the low-type seller from mimicking the medium-type seller. This condition
boils down to:
40<60+(0.4).DM_-(.6).DM (0.4).(0.6) 2300
which is satisfied for any D, k $76.56 Fixing DM at exactly $76.56, then, the medium-
quality seller would truthfully disclose (and not try to emulate a high-quality seller)
when:
60 (0.4).(0.6).(76.56)2 80+(0.2).DR (0.4)- (0.6) 2300 300
which is satisfied for any D,. k $90.61.
I25 This solution is not perfect, of course, since it requires high- and medium-
quality sellers to retain some risk (detailed below).
126 The idea of optimal damages which are supercompensatory in this fashion
might seem strange to some law and economics scholars. However, as the discussion
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face is capitalized into prices that are also significantly higher than the
expected value of the underlying asset. Moreover, the liability risk
that sellers bear is still less than the volatility risk they would have
faced had they kept the asset for themselves. Indeed, the medium-
quality seller now receives an expected payoff of $55.31 here,
exceeding her outside option of $52. Similarly, the high-type seller's
expected payoff is $75.62, which also exceeds her outside option of
$74.67.
Finally, it is important to note that the separating effects of
disclosure laws cash out into a measurable increase in total welfare (at
least compared to the anarchic case). Under the legal regime
outlined above, total social welfare is equal to:
- . ($40)+- . ($55.31)+- . ($75.62)= $56.98,
3 3 3
which, while less than first-best, is larger than the $55.57 generated
under the no-regulation world. Moreover, lest one wonder whether
the modest absolute differences are important, the effect of disclosure
laws in this example is to reduce the expected value of the inefficiency
by a full 32%.117 Consequently, at least when legal rules that regulate
disclosures function well, such rules can represent a fairly efficient
policy choice.
F. The Effects ofJudicial Error
While the truth-enhancing benefits of legal liability are clearly
encouraging, their ultimate merits are far from universal. In
particular, if courts face difficulties in verifying a seller's information
at the time of disclosure,"8 the advantage of law becomes more
questionable. Two particularly worrisome possibilities ofjudicial error
may be relevant here. First, a court may be prone to misdiagnosing
whether the purchased asset has in fact become valueless. Second, a
court may incorrectly perceive what signal actually was sent by the
seller.
in the text indicates, these damages are not actually supercompensatory once one
tactors in the capitalized price effect of prospective damages. Nevertheless, in neither
the literature nor the case law does there appear to be much appreciation for the fact
that apparently supercompensatory remedies would ever be optimal. But see CLAK,
upra note 89, § 4.2, at 150-57 (defending the use of "severe" sanctions in disclosure
contexts). Though I do not focus on this argument here, it is conceivably important
enough tojustify, a separate (and, as yet, unwritten) paper.
That is, (56.98-55.57)/(60-55.57).
See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
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Although empirical data either supporting or rejecting this claim
is difficult to find, my strong conjecture is that there is a much greater
risk of the second type of error than of the first. Indeed, the very
presence of a plaintiff in the courtroom sends a strong signal that
value has been lost and that the underlying asset is worth little or
nothing. Moreover, without first demonstrating that such a loss
occurred, it would be difficult for a plaintiff to make out a theory of
remedy. Thus, it seems likely that the predominant risk of error is
that a court may misunderstand which signal was sent originally. It is
this type of error I concentrate on here.'9
To wit, consider a variation on our running example in which the
court faces a problem in verifying which signal was sent by the seller.
With probability (1 - q), the court correctly identifies the actual
content of the seller's disclosure. However, with the complementary
probability q, the court mistakenly identifies the seller's disclosure for
one of the other two signals, each with probability q/2. This error
structure is reflected in the following table:
Court detects L Court detects M Court detects H
S discloses L 1- q/2 q/2
S discloses M q/2 1-q q/2
S discloses H q/2 q/2 1-
Table 4: Probability of Judicial Error
It is most natural to assume in what follows that 0 q _ 2/3.
Indeed, under such an assumption, q = 0 corresponds to the special
case in which the court is perfectly accurate, while q = 2/3 corresponds
to the situation in which the court's verification skills are nonexistent
and the judge simply chooses one of the three disclosures at
random.3 0
How would the game play out in the face ofjudicial error such as
129 It is important to add, however, that it would not be overly difficult to build
into the model the alternative form ofjudicial error (that is, error in diagnosing the ex
post value of the asset). Indeed, a framework very much like that developed below
could apply to this alternative sort of judicial error, and would yield nearly identical
results. In the interests of clarity and concision, however, I have opted to focus on the
type of error that appears most likely in many litigated disputes.
10 The reader should note that Table 4 implicitly assumes that the court will
commit each type of misdiagnosis with the same probability, q/2. If one were willing to
construct an even more complex framework, one could allow for differential
probabilities for each type of error. Such an alteration contributes unnecessary
complexity to the model, however, as the basic intuitions remain the same.
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that described above? As one might expect, the answer to this
question hinges on the value of q. To see this most clearly, consider
the two extreme cases of q = 0 and q = 2/3, corresponding respectively
to the polar situations of complete judicial accuracy and complete
lack thereof. In the former case, the analysis of the previous
subsection continues to hold true, and appropriately-set damages
rules from Table 3 support a second-best outcome in which sellers
truthfully disclose.
The latter case (that is, q = 2/3) is essentially equivalent to a court
choosing liability at random. Here, just as with anarchy, disclosure
becomes a largely irrelevant action, and, regardless of her signal, the
seller would face an expected liability payment of (D + DH) /3 should
the asset turn out to be worthless. In other words, with errors this severe,
the seller's precise disclosure would have no differential effect on her exposure to
liability. As one might guess, then, the lemons problem would recur
here, and only the low-quality buyer would ever be willing to make a
serious offer in equilibrium. Perhaps worse, however, is the fact that
for positive magnitudes of damages (that is, D, > 0 and/or D, > 0), the
lemons outcome here is actually worse than in the case of anarchy:
for not only is the low-quality seller the only active seller, but she now
must bear the ever-present risk of legal error-a risk that was not
present in a world without law. In such a world, then, the most
efficient institutional response would be to set D, = DH = 0, essentially
eliminating courts from the picture altogether.
When the error rate is somewhat less extreme, however, there still
may be some hope that disclosure regimes can play a nontrivial role.
Indeed, in the example studied here, it is still possible for such
regimes to induce both truth-telling and successful transactions by all
sellers so long as the incidence of judicial error is less than
approximately 24%.
The table below illustrates what such a regime would look like at
error rates of 0% (as a baseline), 10%, and 20%.
0% Error Rate 10% Error Rate 20% Error Rate
Type Darn. S's Payoff Dam. S's Payoff Dam. S's Payoff
L $0.00 $40.00 $0.00 $38.48 $0.00 $36.70
M $76.56 $55.31 $82.54 $54.54 $89.53 $53.60
H $90.61 $75.62 $96.67 $75.27 $103.64 $74.86
Mean $55.42 $56.98 $59.75 $56.10 $64.39 $55.05
Table 5: Equilibrium for Differing Judicial Error Rates
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There are a few important things to notice about this table. First,
as the rate of judicial error increases, damage amounts, along with
prices, tend to rise accordingly, so as to preserve the deterrent role of
legal liability amid the random noise caused by judicial error. As one
moves horizontally across the table, mean damages increase from
$55.42 under perfect accuracy to $64.39 under a 20% error rate.
Second, while judicial inaccuracy makes sellers of all types worse off,
its effects fall particularly hard on sellers of lower-quality assets.
Indeed, note that the introduction of a 20% error rate reduces the
high-quality seller's expected payoff by $0.76, but it reduces the low-
quality seller's expected payoff by a full $3.30.13 The reason that low-
quality sellers suffer more than high-quality sellers is quite easy to
understand. The lowest-quality seller-who sends the most pessimistic
signal possible-risks only one type of mistake: one in which the
court creates liability exposure where the seller intended there to be
none. Conversely, the highest-quality seller-who makes the most
optimistic disclosure possible-also risks only one type of mistake, but
here it is the possibility that a court will err in the direction of
exoneration, rather than liability enhancement.
Finally, and most importantly, the introduction of judicial error
can erode severely the social value of disclosure laws by muddying the
consequences of any given signal. Indeed, as the error rate increases
from 0% to 10%, total welfare declines from $56.98 to $56.10. More
striking, however, is the fact that judicial error can become so severe
that disclosure regimes are no longer economically beneficial.
Indeed, as illustrated in Table 5, once the rate of error grows to 20%,
law actually engenders a worse social outcome ($55.05) than that
which would emerge from a world without any law whatsoever
($55.57).
G. Liberal Safe Harbors
From the analysis above, it appears that judicial error-when
sufficiently severe-eviscerates any net efficiency gains from a legal
liability regime. Consequently, one might be led to conclude that law
can play no constructive role whatsoever in the presence of such
errors.
This conclusion, however, turns out to be somewhat hasty.
Indeed, throughout the analysis above, I have assumed that the task
13 Error reduces the medium-quality seller's payoff by a more moderate, but still
nontrivial, $1.71.
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for the legal rule was to induce truthful disclosures and trade with all
types of buyer-seller combinations. To do so, it was necessary for
courts to employ a distinct damages amount to attend each of the
possible disclosures that a seller might send (DL, D, and D,,). When
judicial errors become extreme, these damages levels must be set so
high that the resulting risk severely hampers any welfare gain.
Conspicuously left out of the analysis are various "partial" disclosure
laws that attempt more modestly to address only some of the
constraints imposed by the lemons problem.
One possible partial solution involves the creation of what is
effectively a more liberal "safe harbor" for disclosing sellers. Recall
that under the schemes previously analyzed, the most pessimistic
signal (L) incurred no liability beyond the risk of court error, 32 while
more optimistic signals (M and H) triggered increasingly greater
threats of subsequent damages. Thus, the legal approach studied
above granted a limited (or "stingy") safe harbor only for the most
pessimistic message possible, while anarchy represented the opposite
extreme, in which a safe harbor applied to every type of disclosure.
As it turns out, a highly error-prone judicial system may sometimes
be able to salvage at least some vestige of the benefits from liability
rules by partially (but not completely) relaxing its safe harbor
protections. Consider, for example, the situation represented by the
two right-most columns of Table 5, in which the incidence of judicial
error was relatively high, at 20%. As the earlier analysis demonstrates,
even with such high error rates it is possible to set up a disclosure
regime that induces truth-telling and trade in all cases; however, so
doing would produce an outcome even worse than anarchy (or
equivalently, an unconditional safe harbor). But now, consider the
effects of a third, middle ground, in which a court extends safe harbor
protection to any seller who discloses either message L or message Al,
but maintains liability for a seller who is found to have disclosed the
most optimistic signal, H. Such a regime, then, would effectively set
DL = D, = 0, and DH > 0, as illustrated below:
13, That is, D, = 0.
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SType Optimal Dam. Signal Sent Mkt. Price S's Payoff Ineffic.
Low DL=$0.00 (L, I} $45.48 $38.43 $1.57
Med. D,-sO.O0 {H} $89.25 $53.94 $6.06
High DH--$91.39 {L, M, H} Noner3 s $74.67 $6.33
Table 6: Optimal Safe Harbor Under 20% Error Rate
Table 6 illustrates predicted equilibrium behavior assuming D,,
were set optimally (which turns out to be at DH = $91.39). First it is
worth noticing that this more generous safe harbor precludes the
high-quality seller from entering into any transaction. This result
should not be surprising, since liberalizing the safe harbor effectively
reduces the number of distinct messages a seller can send to the
market from three to two (as L and M are now legally equivalent
messages). Given that sellers still come in three flavors, then, the safe
harbor's truncation of the number of distinct signals a seller can send
implies that either (i) at least two types of seller would have to "pool"
with one another (that is, employ the same strategy); or (ii) at least
one type of seller would choose to exit the market. Table 6 illustrates
that the latter effect is what tends to occur, both in this example and
more generally. Namely, the high-quality seller finds it unprofitable
to pool with the medium-quality seller, and therefore simply chooses
to make a nonserious price offer, which inevitably is rejected by the
buyer. The low- and medium-quality sellers, on the other hand,
continue to make successful transactions with the buyer.
Second, notice that the more liberal safe harbor rule also affects
the content of the respective sellers' disclosures in interesting and
potentially nonuniform ways. With greater room to maneuver, the
low-quality seller is now indifferent between representing herself as a
low type or medium type because the two signals have identical
effects. Assuming she randomizes between them, her mean disclosure
would become more optimistic under the liberal safe harbor.
Similarly, the medium-quality seller now also exaggerates,
representing herself to be a high-quality seller, so as to distinguish
herself from the low-quality seller. 3 4  The high-quality seller, in
contrast, is indifferent about the signal she sends, since she plans on
" The high-type seller makes a nonserious offer (such as $400), and thus there is
no market-clearing price.
134 Of course, the buyer is aware of this exaggeration, and values the asset
accordingly.
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making no serious price offers. Thus, the high-quality seller may well
randomize among the three signals, and consequently her mean
disclosure becomes more pessimistic after the liberalization of the safe
harbor.
Third, note that the damages incurred by the medium-quality
seller are large ($91.39), at least relative to the level she committed to
in Table 5 ($89.53). There are two reasons for this increase. First, the
medium-quality seller no longer fears the possibility of a "false
positive," in which a court misdiagnoses her moderate signal to trigger
even greater liability than she intended. The only type of judicial
error she faces now is a "false negative," in which a court absolves her
from liability entirely. Thus, she is willing to risk greater liability
exposure in those instances in which the court gets it right. Second,
for roughly the same reasons, the low-quality seller also is relatively
less worried about severe false positives under the liberal safe harbor,
and it therefore takes a larger damages amount to deter her from
attempting to pass herself off as a higher-quality seller.
Finally, and most importantly, the equilibrium described above
results in an expected level ofjoint welfare equal to:
1 1 11. ($38.43)+-. ($53.94)+- . ($74.67)= $55.68,
3 3 3
which exceeds that associated with both the stingy safe harbor in
Table 5 ($55.05) and the categorical safe harbor of anarchy ($55.57).
Note, however, that while the liberal safe harbor results in a Pareto
improvement over anarchy,"5 high-quality sellers are slightly worse off
when compared to the stingy safe harbor provision analyzed in the
previous sub-Part."t This observation is important, for it suggests that
the high-quality seller would strictly prefer a system that did not
exclude her from entering the market. In particular, a seller of type
H might desire to contract out of this liberal safe harbor regime,
making an express warranty exceeding even that which the above
scheme associates with the most optimistic signal. If she did so,
however, it would have negative implications for other seller types,
who now could bear greater risk should courts similarly err in
identifying when such express terms exist. Given this negative
externality, not only would a liberal safe harbor regime be socially
optimal, but it might also have to be immutable in nature, so as to
' In other words, no type of seller is worse off, and at least one is better off.
Indeed, the high-quality seller receives an expected payoff of $74.67 under the
liberal safe harbor, but S74.86 under the stingy one.
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prevent the high type of seller from attempting to contract around
i.137it.
1
Nevertheless, as viewed ex ante, the analysis clearly reveals a chief
value of liberal safe harbors, which can be summarized as follows:
In the presence of judicial inaccuracy, a liberalized safe harbor regime
can help to reduce the equilibrium risk borne by many sellers. It does
so, however, at the cost of constraining at least some sellers' ability to
make credible disclosures about their quality, which in turn deters them
from making value-enhancing transactions. When judicial inaccuracy is
sufficiently severe, however, the former effect tends to dominate the
latter effect.
H. Norms and Disclosure
The discussion thus far has largely neglected how norms fit within
the analysis. This omission seems especially conspicuous in light of
(1) the title of this Symposium; and (2) the title of this Article.
Nevertheless, the long windup has been deliberate, and with any luck
it has set the stage for understanding how (and whether) "norms" of
disclosure interact with the strategic considerations mentioned above.
The current sub-Part takes substantially more direct aim at this precise
question.
As noted in the Introduction of this Article, there is currently an
interesting and sometimes contentious debate about the normative
relationship between behavioral norms and substantive law.' ," This
debate implicates disclosure law as well. For example, some scholars
recently have suggested 39 that after the passage of the liberalized safe
harbor provision in the PSLRA, issuers continued to make relatively
truthful disclosures, even though such disclosures were augmented by
the sort of cautionary language prescribed by the Act (and thus did
not risk future liability). If one interprets this observation as evidence
that sellers are prone to adopting a taste for accurate disclosure, their
observed reactions may well justify the liberalization of the safe harbor
provisions within securities law. In other words, this logic suggests
that the existence of disclosure norms (at least good ones) justifies a
less aggressive posture of law.
In this sub-Part, I shall argue that even if truth-telling norms are
37 See also Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 19 (making a similar argument).
38 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1537, 1541-42 (2000) (documenting "the caveats that social psychological research
suggest for the value of social norms for policymakers").
139 Johnson et al., supra note 12.
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plausible within a disclosure setting (a question I defer until later 40),
the implications for law are not nearly as clear cut as the above logic
suggests. To be sure, truth-telling norms may be able to do some of
the sanctioning work that a legal rule otherwise might have to
perform, enabling courts to reduce damages without affecting
deterrence. But there very well may be other dimensions on which
legal rules operate-such as the very threshold at which liability is
triggered in the first place-where the presence of norms actually
militates in favor of more aggressive legal doctrines than those that
would be appropriate in the absence of such norms. In other words, I
shall argue that disclosure norms and disclosure laws may be policy
complements of (rather than substitutes for) one another.
1. Truth-Telling Norms
The first step in the argument is to understand how norms might
be beneficial within the disclosure context studied in this Article. But
in order to do so, it will be necessary to reiterate what I mean when I
refer to a norm. As noted in the Introduction, my focus in what
follows concentrates on a behavioral rather than a moral account of
norms.II Thus, my conception of a norm is as a tendency for
individuals to adopt a particular strategy or pattern of behavior within
a broader social context. Moreover, I shall suppose predominantly in
what follows that such norms tend to be value-creating rather than
value-destroying or impeding.
Both of these assertions are potentially contestable. Indeed, there
may be situations in which norms do not easily arise, or when they do
they have destructive effects. Indeed, I shall argue later that
disclosure contexts may represent an example of both of these
problems. But for now, I shall proceed under a view of norms that is
relatively sanguine about their possibilities.
Returning to our continuing example, let us consider one way in
which one could introduce a norm of "truth telling" into the analysis.
In particular, suppose that sellers experience a measure of "disutility"
if they make an optimistic disclosure to buyers about an asset that later
turns out to be worth nothing. Under such an approach, a seller who
represents herself to be of medium quality would suffer a cost whose
monetary equivalent is G in the event that the asset turns out to be
worthless, while a seller representing herself to be of high quality
See infra Part II.H.1.
e S~ supra text accompan)ing notes 20-24.
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would suffer an analogous cost of G, when G, < G. (For simplicity,
suppose that a seller who represented herself to be of low quality
would suffer no future disutility, content that she had "warned" the
buyer by sending the most pessimistic disclosure possible.)
Although I do not attach a unique story to the source of the
extralegal disutility described above, it potentially could come from
any number of alternative accounts. It might, for example, represent
a reputational loss that a seller experiences as other market players
come to think she is unreliable. Or, alternatively, it might represent
the punishment that a seller expects to suffer in the future because
other market participants believe her to have acted dishonestly. Or, it
might represent a more direct measure of disutility, such as the shame
that one feels at having disappointed other market participants. Any
of these interpretations (and perhaps others) conceivably admit the
142representation made here.
If one views truth-telling norms in this fashion, then there is an
obvious implication for when and whether additional legal sanctions
are necessary, and, if so, what they would look like. Most directly,
consider the case studied in Part ll.B, in which a seller's information
was unverifiable and courts were not prone to error. Moreover, let us
assume arbitrarily that G, = $2 while GH = $5. The existence of truth-
telling norms acts as an additional deterrent for sellers who are
contemplating misrepresentation. Because of this deterrent, the
terms of an optimal disclosure law are likely to change as well, a
prediction that is borne out in equilibrium. Table 7, below, describes
the players' equilibrium behavior in the presence of a truth-telling
norm and optimal damages:
142 The reader should note that I am not asserting that reputational costs,
anticipated punishment, and shame are identical concepts. Indeed, there are many
important differences between these concepts--differences that often matter
analytically. Nevertheless, within the current framework, each of these concepts lends
itself to a utilitarian representation similar to that analyzed in the text. Given that each
of them has been posited to be a source for norms, this observation adds to the
generality of the argument.
The alert and skeptical reader, of course, may still be troubled by this formulation,
particularly given that S does not suffer any disutility unless the asset turns out to be
worth nothing. This reader might argue that a more parsimonious account of truth-
telling norms-particularly those rooted in feelings of guilt or shame-would assume
that the seller's disutility from misrepresentation would be realized at the moment she
lies, not simply when she is caught. Indeed, such internalized norms are the basis for
so-called "character norms" discussed at length by Cooter and Eisenberg in this issue.
Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 23. I address this possibility explicitly in the next Part
of this Article (which turns out to strengthen rather then weaken my argument).
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SType Signal Dam. Amt. Mkt. Price Ss payoff Ineffic.
Low L S0.00 $40 $40.00 $0.00
Med. Al $72.06 $88.82 $54.81 S5.19
High H $84.15 $96.83 $74.76 $5.24
Table 7: Equilibrium Under Truth-Telling Norm:
.= $2; G. = $5
Comparing Table 7 with its earlier counterpart (Table 3), it
becomes clearer how disclosure norms and law interact with one
another. Within this particular context, at least, legal sanctions and
extralegal norms clearly function as substitutes for one another, but
far from perfect ones (as we shall see below). Note that truth-telling
norms clearly can do part of the deterrence work that damages had
done hitherto, thereby allowing a reduction in the requisite damages
levels (by $4.54 in the case of medium-quality disclosures and $6.46 in
the case of high-quality disclosures). Correspondingly, market
clearing prices also decline, reflecting the reduced actuarial value of
prospective legal recovery in the presence of smaller damages.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the introduction of truth-
telling nonns into the analysis does not constitute a complete "wash"
from an efficiency perspective. Indeed, in the equilibrium illustrated
in Table 7, the total expected welfare of the parties is equal to $56.52,
quite obviously less than the $56.98 if no truth-telling norms existed
and damages did all the work. Moreover, as the importance of the
truth-telling norm increases (that is, Q and G, grow), this differential
continues to widen. Note also that truth-telling norms such as these
not only fare worse than law from an aggregate efficiency perspective,
but they are in fact Pareto-inferior to it: no one is better off under the
posited set of norms, and some parties are worse off.
In order to understand why this efficiency loss occurs, one must
recognize a critical difference in the ways that law and truth-telling
norms deter misbehavior. On the one hand, legal rules deter seller
misrepresentations by creating a credible threat of future transfer
payments from sellers to disappointed buyers. Truth-telling norms,
on the other hand, deter not through the threat of transfer payments,
but rather through the prospect that the seller might suffer an
uncompensated hedonic harm in the future. Such harm represents a
pure welfare loss. The buyer does not gain when it is invoked, and he
is therefore unwilling to capitalize the ex ante value of the seller's
actuarial loss into the price of the asset. Thus, truth-telling norms
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carry with them a component of deadweight loss that is not present in
legal rules. Because this deadweight loss is always invoked (at least
with some probability), the efficiency loss should not be terribly
surprising.
Despite the apparent advantage of law over norms, one should
take care not to overinterpret this result. First, the existence of truth-
telling norms (including those described above) is probably less a
product of policy choices than it is a constraint on such choices.
Thus, a society may not be free to "choose" whether it has norms, and
the welfare comparison does not reflect a feasible pair of policy
options. But additionally, the way that we have introduced norms into
the analysis (that is, as ex post disutilities) tends to call into question
the very enterprise of even making welfare comparisons, because they
effectively stack the deck against norms by characterizing them as
deadweight losses. Had we alternatively chosen to represent norms
not as a psychic "cost" for disappointing buyer expectations, but
rather as a hedonic "benefit" for confirming those expectations (a
distinction that seems almost semantic), the welfare comparisons
would have cut in the opposite direction. But of course, such a
conclusion would have been equally questionable.
Consequently, one should be somewhat wary of the indeterminate
enterprise of comparing norms to law from a welfare perspective. In
light of this problem, it is perhaps more fruitful and interesting to
focus merely on whether and how the existence of disclosure norms
affects the underlying structure of optimal legal rules. And as the
discussion above indicates, truth-telling norms tend to represent
partial substitutes for legal sanctions and therefore may tend to soften
the severity of optimal sanctions once other norms are taken into
account. Left unaddressed, however, is the extent to which this
tendency persists in the presence ofjudicial error-situations in which
legal rules are not especially apt policy instruments. I focus on this
question in the next Part.
2. Norms, Errors, and Safe Harbors
The discussion above has noted the potential for norms to
substitute (at least partially) for legal sanctions-a potential that
others writing in the field have also noted. One might surmise that
this potential is most likely to be realized when, for one reason or
143 Seesources cited supra note 15.
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another, legal rules are difficult to implement or apply with much
efficacy. Such a situation almost certainly characterizes the case of
extreme judicial error. Indeed, as the earlier analysis concluded, even
in the absence of norms, severe risks of error may justify slackening
disclosure laws by, for example, liberalizing safe harbor rules so as to
temper the prospective risks imposed by erroneous verdicts.
One might therefore conjecture that adding norms into the mix
should push this intuition even further. Indeed, unlike liability rules,
the sanctions that attend a norm violation do not hinge on a court's
correct diagnosis of a seller's earlier disclosure. Rather, they are
realized immediately by the seller herself as soon as the buyer's
expectations (created by the earlier disclosure) are disappointed. The
ability of norm-based sanctions to sidestep judicial uncertainty, then,
would seem to buttress the argument that legal rules should be de-
emphasized in the presence of severe judicial error.
However, this reasoning, while facially plausible, is potentially
quite flawed. Indeed, the very accuracy of norm-based sanctions
espoused above may justify, rather than impeach the desirability of
complementary legal liability. In particular, in the context of our
running example, truth-telling norms such as those discussed above
can militate against generous safe harbors in the presence of judicial
error, even though such safe harbors would be efficient in the absence
of norms.
Consider the same example developed above, but suppose now
that courts are prone to errors that cause them to misdiagnose the
seller's disclosure with probability q (with the form of misdiagnosis
split equally among the other two possible signals). Moreover, assume
that q = 20%; recall that this is a level high enough to justify a
liberalized safe harbor (that is, D2 = D = $0) in the absence of norms.
Table 8 below compares the optimal legal regime under two scenarios:
under the first, no disclosure norms exist; under the second, sellers
who disclose M or H suffer respective disutilities of $2 and $5 should
they make a sale and should the asset eventually prove valueless.
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Seller G =$O; G =$ G = $2; G, =$5
Type Opt. Dam. Signal Price Opt. Dam. Signal Price
Low DL = $0.00 tL, M $45.48 DL = $0.00 L $51.15
Med. D = $0.00 H $89.25 D,, = $86.40 Al $91.63
High D, = $91.39 IL, M, HI None D = $99.44 H $97.64
Table 8: Optimal Damages Under Differing Truth-Telling Norms;
Error Rate = 20%
The left-hand section of the table simply restates the equilibrium
illustrated earlier in Table 6 (in which disclosure norms are absent).
Recall from that analysis that the optimal legal rule-in the presence
of a 20% error rate-entailed a liberalized safe harbor rule, in which
neither signal L nor signal M triggered liability. Only if a court
detected the most optimistic signal possible (R) did the seller incur
liability, in the amount of $91.39. Moreover, recall that under such a
regime, high-quality sellers essentially fled the market, finding it
unprofitable to trade.
The introduction of disclosure norms (reflected in the right-hand
portion of the table) clearly changes the qualitative characteristics of
the optimal legal rule. But surprisingly, rather than diminishing the
domain ofjudicial intervention, norms appear to enhance it. Indeed,
notice that the optimal legal rule in this context prescribes a stingy
(rather than liberal) safe harbor, in which only the most pessimistic
form of disclosure (L) allows a seller to escape future liability.
In order to understand this counterintuitive effect, it is necessary
to appreciate once again the incentivizing role that norms play. As
noted above, norms create a legally independent reason for players to
be predisposed toward truthful disclosure. In light of such
proclivities, there is less remaining "work" for legal rules to do in
sanctioning misfeasance. Consequently, an optimal legal rule in the
presence of disclosure norms can impose smaller penalties on the
actors while still maintaining a targeted level of deterrence.'
However, the very act of relaxing the requisite level of damages also
reduces the amount of equilibrium legal risk on sellers-sufficiently
less, in fact, that it once again becomes practical and efficient for the
144To see this effect in Table 8, notice that the damages a medium-quality seller
faces in equilibrium clearly decreases from $99.44 in a world without norms, to $91.63
in a world with them. Recall that in a norm-less world, the liberal safe harbor causes
the medium-quality seller to overstate her quality, representing herself to be of high-
quality so as to distinguish herself from the low-quality seller.
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law to incentivize disclosure and market transactions by all three types
of sellers. Doing so, of course, requires the sellers to be able to send
three distinct signals, which in turn implies distinct damages
associated with each type of disclosure.
Reiterating, because truth-telling norms are able to carry some of
the load in affecting individual incentives, they enable courts to
choose more moderate legal sanctions than would otherwise be
necessary to achieve a given level of deterrence. This attenuation in
legal sanctions, in turn, reduces the aggregate error costs associated
with legal rules. In so doing, however, it simultaneously enables error-
prone courts to be more aggressive than they otherwise would be in
establishing legal triggers for liability. And thus, a society that benefits
from a healthy norm of truthful disclosure ironically may have what
appears to be a more rigorous set of antifraud provisions than a
similarly situated society that is not characterized by such norms.
This result stands in stark contrast with much of the received
wisdom about the relationship between law and norms in corporate
and commercial contexts. Indeed, as noted above, the existence of
efficiency-enhancing norms is commonly perceived to provide a
justification for abandoning or substantially relaxing legal sanctions.
1 4
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The example above demonstrates very much the opposite. With
error-prone courts, optimal disclosure laws would tend (at least in this
example) to be less aggressive in a world without truth-telling norms
than in a world with them. Any norm-based defense of legal
nonintervention would therefore have to reconcile itself with the
potential complementarity between law and norms-a reconciliation
that does not appear to be widely appreciated.
111. EXTENSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND CAVEATS
While the observations of the preceding Part provide some
interesting insights, it must be kept in mind that these observations
are products of a simplified model of strategic behavior. As with any
model, the example developed does not capture all of the intricacies
mad dimensions of the interaction between legal institutions and
norms. Thus, an inquiry into the robustness of the above intuitions is
probably in order. While a complete accounting of all possible
variations is impossible for an article of this length, one nonetheless
can explore how certain extensions may alter its results. This Part
W, See supra note 15 (citing scholarship that advocates the retrenchment or
elimination of legal sanctions when and where strong norm-like behavior exists).
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examines three such extensions. First, I consider the effects of
introducing fully internalized norms of honesty, whose utilitarian
effects are felt not ex post (as assumed above), but at the very moment
of disclosure. Second, I consider the relationship between the
intuitions exposed here and an alternative source of complementarity
between law and norms, which some have labeled the "expressive law."
Finally, I examine how one might go about endogenizing the norms
described in the previous Part and whether such an effort would
significantly alter the results.
A. Internalized Norms
In spite of its aim for generality, the preceding Part made a
particular (and potentially limiting) assumption about the nature of
truth-telling norms. Explicitly, it assumed that norms took the form of
a utilitarian loss suffered by the seller who has disclosed a relatively
optimistic signal, but whose asset turns out to be worthless.14  Note
that such a definition explicitly ties the role of norms to ex post
outcomes: sellers suffer disutility only if they disappoint the market by
making a disclosure that in hindsight proves too optimistic.
Moreover, even a truthful seller incurs this loss should her asset turn
out to be worthless.
Such a representation may seem relatively unappealing for those
who conceive of norms as an internalized element of preferences.' 
7
Indeed, if an individual actually harbored an internalized preference
for truth-telling, then such a norm would operate on a substantially
distinct plane from that described above: it would be immediate and
direct. The seller who lies would suffer measurable disutility
immediately, regardless of whether the asset turns out to be valuable.
By the same token, the seller who discloses truthfully should not
suffer, under this approach, the risk of future disutility depending on
the asset's ex post value. Because the model developed above does
not represent norms of truth-telling in this direct, immediate fashion,
it is natural to wonder whether its conclusions would be compromised
by this variation.
Significantly, it turns out that none of the qualitative arguments
developed above are critically affected by the introduction of
internalized norms. On the contrary, the most critical assumption for
146 See supra text accompanying note 142.
147 See, e.g., Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 1723-24 (likening extralegal
behavior to "character norms" that are simply a component of preferences).
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tie thesis of this Article is that truth-telling norms are less susceptible
to error than are legal rules-an assumption that becomes amplified
when norms are fully internalized into individual preferences.
Consequently, if truth-telling norms were so ingrained in individuals'
preferences to act immediately upon the disclosure rather than upon
ex post realization, the effect would be to fortify the accuracy
advantage that norm-like behavior has over legal sanctions. In turn,
my core arguments actually become stronger if one conceives of
norms as acting at the time of disclosure rather than realization.
B. Expressive and Informational Roles of Law
A second possible extension of the analysis would incorporate the
insights developed above with what some refer to as the "expressive"
role of law in effectuating and perpetuating norms. 14s As a number of
scholars have noted, it is difficult for norms of any flavor to work on a
society-wide basis unless there is a general consensus among
individuals about what distinguishes norm violation from norm
compliance. For example, reputational norms require people to
agree about what differentiates a good from a bad reputation. Repeat
players must coordinate as to which actions constitute cooperation
and which constitute defection. Actors in a system of network
economies must mutually agree about which standard or contractual
form has the widest appeal and recognizability. Even those who
advocate internalized sources of norms assert that the source of this
internalization often resides in a moral position common to everyone
in the society.
The process of coordination, however, is rarely uncomplicated. It
is often a daunting task to induce a large, diffuse set of individuals to
act in concert with one another, particularly when there is no readily
available and ubiquitously respected device to orchestrate their
individual actions. Legal rules, however, may provide just the public
vehicle for ensuring that the applicable standards of behavior are
common knowledge (or at least close to it).14 ' By simply expressing
the type of behavior that constitutes the applicable norm, legal rules
very well may constitute an official, notorious, and public source of
information, providing a focal point around which norm-like behavior
14" sc,, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585
(1998).
J4, See Eric Talley, Interdisciplinary Gap Filling: Game Theory and the Law, 22 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 1055 (1997) (reviewing BAMRD ET AL., supra note 1).
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may begin to accrete on a society-wide basis.' 5°
In spite of its renewed popularity, most of the arguments
pertaining to expressive law are hardly novel. Indeed, the kernel of
such arguments can be traced at least as far back as Hume."'
Nevertheless, the notions embedded in theories of expressive law hold
relevance for my core thesis-not as a limitation, but rather as an
additional extension of the idea that law and norms may well be
complements of one another. Indeed, if law serves a pivotal
expressive function in engendering norms, then many sorts of norms
would be unattainable without the concurrent support of law to
coordinate, educate, and inform individuals about the aspirational
content of norm compliance. Thus, I am relatively untroubled (and
am even slightly encouraged) by the arguments offered by expressive
150 Some scholars have gone even further, arguing that in addition to providing
information about the applicable norm, the content of an expressed legal rule may
actually change people's preferences more directly. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good
Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577,
1580 (2000) (discussing social norms that regulate civic acts); Richard H. McAdams, A
Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1672 (2000) (noting that
behavior tends to follow what legal decisionmakers proclaim); Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 953-55 (1996) (discussing "the function
of law in expressing social values and encouraging social norms to move in particular
directions"). While this additional claim has been challenged by others, including
Scott, supra note 20, at 1637-46, the content of this challenge is not directly relevant to
the current discussion, and I therefore omit its details.
151 Hume's account of norm compliance appears to be largely influenced by
reputational considerations:
What farther contributes to encrease their solidity, is the interest of our
reputation, after the opinion, that a merit or demerit attends justice or injustice, is
once firmly establish'd among mankind. There is nothing, which touches us
more nearly than our reputation, and nothing on which our reputation more
depends than our conduct, with relation to the property of others. For this
reason, every one, who has any regard to his character, or who intends to live
on good terms with mankind, must fix an inviolable law to himself, never, by
any temptation, to be induc'd to violate those principles, which are essential
to a man of probity and honour.
DAvID HUNME, A TREATiSE OF HUMAN NATuRE 501 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1965) (1888). According to Hume, the imposition of law is what places a public
patina of notoriety on what forms of behavior constitute norm compliance and norm
violation. It is, in fact, a public signal, which itself helps individuals assess their own
compliance with the norm and helps others to agree about the same rules, so as to
trigger these reputational devices correctly. Indeed, as Hume continued,
[I] n the state of nature, or that imaginary state, which preceded society, there
be neither justice nor injustice, yet I assert not, that it was allowable, in such a
state, to violate the property of others. I only maintain, that there was no such
thing as property; and consequently cou'd be no such thing as justice or
injustice.
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law theorists, as they dovetail nicely, albeit on distinct grounds, with
those offered here. '
C. Endogenous Norms
One of the more convenient attributes of the foregoing analysis is
that it lent itself to a relatively simple-if not altogether concise-
analysis of equilibrium behavior. Despite the necessity of accounting
for multiple seller types, Bayesian beliefs, and strategic outcomes, the
analysis was much simplified by the fact that the game could be
analyzed as a simple one-time exchange between the buyer and seller.
Indeed, recall that the utilitarian notion of norms that entered the
analysis above was assumed to exist exogenously, as a hedonic
disutility in the event that the seller disappointed the buyer through
an optimistic signal to the market.' 3 Thus, it was possible to confine
the analysis of the model to a relatively straightforward, static
environment. Moreover, utilizing this specification facilitated a
number of general conclusions about the role of norms as behavioral
phenomena, without forcing us to commit to a single theoretical
account of them.'"
While this approach is certainly tractable and general, such traits
come at a considerable price: the), are a relatively artificial and thin
account of a norm (at least by some measures). For example, one of
the motivations offered for the utilitarian norms presented in the
previous Part was that they represented the anticipated downstream
punishments that the seller could expect in future periods should she
deviate today.'5 While intuitively clear, it nonetheless seems a bit odd
to invoke such imagery without explicitly attempting to analyze the
very intertemporal considerations that supposedly create such
incentives in the first place. The purpose of this Part, then, is to
demonstrate how the example developed above might be extended to
a dynamic environment in which the applicable norm emerges
' At the same time, however, I take no position here on the ultimate
persuasiveness of the expressive law position, as it is somewhat independent of the one
offered here. See generally Scott, supra note 20, at 1627 (criticizing expressive theories
of law that are unrelated to simple information dissemination as incapable of yielding
falsifiable predictions).
1 3 That is, through the introduction of disutilities G and G,,
4 See supra text accompanying note 24.
' Another related but not identical rationale was that the hedonic harm
represented the reputational loss suffered by the seller. Although commonly
perceived as the same, reputational losses and anticipated punishments from other
market participants are not identical concepts. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 1, at 187.
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endogenously through repeat play.
At the onset, however, I should note that this form of
generalization poses at least two difficulties for an analysis of this type,
one technical and the other conceptual. The technical difficulty
stems from the fact that superimposing a dynamic interaction on top
of an already complicated signaling game can complicate significantly
one's formal analysis. This added complexity sometimes renders both
predictions and intuitions somewhat elusive in the larger analysis.' 5"
Second, introducing repeat play tends to increase (often
significantly) the number of distinct equilibria that are plausible
outcomes of repeat play. While a simple repetition of the static
equilibria of the game is still a plausible outcome, new equilibria also
emerge that would not have been possible in the absence of
repetition. Indeed, it is the repetition of the strategic interaction that
allows the parties themselves to punish today's misdeed by threats of
market punishment or outright exclusion tomorrow. In such
contexts, it is difficult to predict which of these many equilibria will
ultimately emerge as the most salient.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, one can still hazard a few
general observations about the relationship between legal rules and
endogenous norms of behavior in the disclosure context. To facilitate
such observations, however, I must resuscitate briefly the extended
example studied in the previous Part, making the following
modifications to its framework to simplify the analysis. Rather than
contending with three distinct asset types, suppose that there are only
two: a high-quality asset (H), which yields a successful payoff 60% of
the time; and a low-quality asset (L), which yields success only 40% of
the time. Assume further that both players are risk-neutral, but that S
values the asset (regardless of its quality) at $8 less than B.'17 Finally,
suppose that each stage of the signaling game ends immediately with
156 For example, Eric Posner has offered a theory of norms that advocates
combining repeat play with an information signaling game (albeit a slightly different
one). See POSNER, supra note 15, at 16 (offering a model of norm-based cooperation
among players, in which individuals play cooperatively to signal their relative patience
to others). Perhaps appreciating the complexity of his enterprise, however, Posner
elects not to analyze a formal model built around such premises, opting instead to
opine about the qualitative characteristics that, in his estimation, such a model might
exhibit. Id. at 35 (recognizing that he does not fully address such methodological
issues, and noting that "some of these gaps... reflect mathematical and theoretical
problems ... to which I have nothing to contribute").
157 Thus, the gains from trade now exist because of different tastes over the asset
itself rather than different risk preferences. This alteration greatly simplifies the
mathematics.
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probability 1/10, but continues to a next round with probability
9/10.,""
As before, let us begin within a state of anarchy, in which there is
no law regarding disclosures whatsoever. Consider the following
question: can the repeated game yield a "cooperative" equilibrium in
which the seller always tells the truth notwithstanding the absence of a
legal rule? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to answer
two additional questions. First, what is the implicit punishment that
the buyer would inflict upon the seller should the seller deviate from
the posited equilibrium? And second, what criterion will the buyer
employ for determining when to invoke this punishment scheme?
Regarding the first question, there is frequently no unique
punishment scheme in the context of repeat play that implements a
cooperative equilibrium. Many punishments may serve as equally or
at least sufficiently effective implicit deterrents. Nevertheless, it seems
natural to speculate that an effective scheme would be for the parties
to revert to playing the one-shot equilibrium that punishes the
deviating seller maximally while having minimal effect on the buyer.
Such a scheme can be found in the so-called lemons equilibrium, in
which only the low-type seller participates. 59
In addition, an endogenous account of norms requires one to
specify precisely under what conditions this punishment scheme
would be invoked. This is also a difficult question to answer in the
disclosure context, since the buyer is unable to discern with certainty
whether the seller has misrepresented her type during negotiations.
Thus, any cooperative equilibrium will have to entail the use of an
indirect informational proxy by which the buyer "detects" deviations
from truth-telling. Once again, a number of candidate criteria are
possible, but perhaps the most natural one is what is commonly
known as a "trigger strategy": under such a strategy, the buyer would
invoke the punishment scheme whenever an asset that the seller has
disclosed as having high quality turns out to be worthless.
In simpler repeat settings in which "defection" is publicly
observable, the buyer's invocation of a punishment scheme always
follows a known deviation by the seller from the applicable norm. In
this case, however, the seller's underlying truthfulness can never be
J' , Other than this probability of continuation, assume that there is no other form
of discounting for future payoffs.
". Further, in order to make this punishment scheme as imposing as possible,
suppose that in those instances in which B and S do transact (that is, when the seller
has a low-quality asset), the buyer receives all the gains from trade.
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completely verified; and thus, an unpleasant (if unavoidable)
characteristic of trigger strategies is that they may invoke a
punishment scheme accidentally, even when the seller has truthfully
represented her high quality. Because of the risk of such false
positives, then, the most efficient punishment schemes will require
reversion to the lemons equilibrium for only a fixed number of
periods (which I shall denote by N) after which the parties could
return to cooperative play. The most efficient scheme, then, is the
one that minimizes the total length of this punishment phase.
It turns out that, without any law, the cooperative behavior
described above simply cannot be supported as a long-term
equilibrium in the repeated game between B and S. More precisely,
the only way that the posited trigger strategy punishment scheme
could deter dishonesty by the seller would be by setting N = -c. Even if
a seller began by revealing her type honestly, the trigger strategy
would eventually be invoked by accident, causing a reversion to the
lemons equilibrium that would last forever. In other words, in the
absence of law, the only plausible sort of equilibrium play (at least in
the long term) is a repeat interaction of the one-shot lemons
equilibrium.
If one introduces even a little law, however, these disappointing
conclusions need not persist. For example, suppose that the
underlying legal rule imposed a one-time sanction of $30 on a seller
who discloses a high-quality signal but whose asset turns out to be
worthless. Importantly, this damages amount, while certainly non-
trivial, is still too small to induce truthful revelation in the one-shot
game.' 6° Nevertheless, the combined effects of both the legal sanction
and the anticipated extralegal punishment are sufficient to induce
sellers to disclose perfectly, so long as the punishment period lasts at
least 10 periods.16 1 In other words, even moderate legal liability-
insufficient alone to induce truthful disclosures-can catalyze the
development of extralegal disclosure norms that would not have been
possible in the absence of the legal sanctions.
The reason for this complementarity is relatively simple.
Although extralegal norms are a potentially powerful deterrent, they
ultimately must be self-enforcing. This requirement places a natural
limit on both the sanctions that nonculpable parties can extract from
166 In order to induce truth-telling in the one-shot game, the applicable damages
would have to equal approximately $34.
161 The proof of this claim is somewhat technical and is available from the author.
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putative wrongdoers, and on the willingness of buyers and sellers alike
to invoke a relatively unattractive punishment scheme. Legal
sanctions, even relatively mild ones, add to the credibility of such
punishment schemes by imposing an additional transfer payment that
is both attractive to nonculpable parties and unattractive to culpable
ones. The net effect is that such legal sanctions complement the
power and plausibility of extralegal sanctions, even though neither is
sufficient alone to induce honest behavior.
To be sure, the foregoing extension is relatively tentative and
illustrative. There are a number of considerations that, in the
interests of time and space, it neglects to analyze."2 Nevertheless, if
nothing else, the analysis above demonstrates that the
complementarity between law and norms need not evaporate when
one expands the analysis to consider norms as endogenous strategies
emerging from repeat play. On the contrary, the existence of at least
some law may be a critical precondition to the existence and stability
of certain types of extralegal norms.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to scrutinize formally the
common assertion that legal rules and extralegal norms tend to be
policy substitutes for one another. In so doing, I have focused
explicitly on information disclosure contexts that commonly implicate
areas of corporate practice. My analysis suggests a substantially more
nuanced and tenuous relationship between law and norms than the
common wisdom generally implies. While norms very well may
substitute for certain functions of law (such as the imposition of
sanctions), they simultaneously may encourage the aggressive
expansion of other functions (such as triggers of liability).
Consequently, I have argued that law and norms can just as plausibly
operate as policy complements of one another as they can as policy
substitutes. These conclusions are important, both for those
interested in determining where extralegal norms play important
practical roles and for reform-minded scholars seeking to craft legal
rules with an eye towards the effects of norms.
As is true with many arguments about norms, my analysis may
1, For example, the analysis above does not introduce legal error into the analysis,
an omission that probably biases the outcome in favor of complementarity between law
and endogenous norms. Nevertheless, so long as courts are not wholly incompetent, I
conjecture, the basic intuitions would persist.
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have raised just as many questions as it has answered, all of which I
leave for future endeavors. For example, it has left relatively
unexplored a number of legal applications in which problems of
private information loom large, both within and without corporate
law. Nor has it ventured very far into predicting the sources of norm-
like behavior or specifying the precise conditions under which norms
and law are more prone to act as substitutes or complements.
Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis helps to underscore an
emerging realization among norms scholars:113 in spite of the natural
attraction that the concept holds for academics and policymakers, and
in spite of the numerous law review articles and books dedicated to
the topic, norms remain a complex and elusive phenomenon. We are
still, unfortunately, extremely far from formulating a general,
predictive and falsifiable theory of norms. The absence of such a
theory somewhat undercuts our current ability to formulate with
much confidence legal policy recommendations based on norms.
More optimistically, however, these complexities virtually ensure that
norms research will (and should) remain near the forefront of our
collective agendas for some time to come.
163 See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 10, at 571-72 (discussing the "hindsight bias" and
its effects on legal and social norms); Scott, supra note 20, at 1607 (noting that
although scholarship about social norms has "come a long way," we lack even a "basic
consensus on the proper definition of a social norm").
